SIPE REPORT

PRELIMINARY EXPERT REPORT

A. W. RICHARD SIPE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

BACKGROUND/EXPERIENCE/RESEARCH 1

FIRST PHASE: THE INTERFACE OF PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
PROBLEMS OF CATHOLIC CLERICS 5

SECOND PHASE: THE ADVENT OF REPORTING LAWS 6

THIRD PHASE: THE FUSION OF PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE OPENING OF CATHOLIC TREATMENT CENTERS 7

FOURTH PHASE: VICTIMS OF PRIEST
SEXUAL ABUSE/THE BISHOPS RESPONSE 10

FIFTH PHASE: THE SECRET SYSTEM IS BREACHED 12

THE HARM TO VICTIMS OF PRIEST/RELIGIOUS SEXUAL ABUSE 13

COMPONENTS OF THE SECRET SYSTEM--SEXUAL ACTIVITY
BY PUBLICLY CELIBATE PRIESTS AND RELIGIOUS 15

DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE NEGLIGENCE
OF VARIOUS DEFENDANTS 19

DIOCESE OF DALLAS 22

MILITARY VICARIATE 23

RAY K. MCNAMARA, PH.D. 23

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF FR. WILLIAM HUGHES 25

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF FR. ROBERT R. PEEBLES, JR. 27

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF RUDOLPH KOS 30

CONCLUSION 32

INTRODUCTION

1. My name is A. W. Richard Sipe. I am a psychotherapist and psychiatrist assistant in the state of Maryland. I was professed as a Benedictine monk in 1953 and ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1959. I retired from religious life and the priesthood with the permission of Rome in 1970. I have spent 37 years as a counselor, psychotherapist, and teacher of Catholic clerics and a counselor and psychotherapist to lay Catholics with a history of sexual involvement with Catholic priests and religious.

2. I have been asked to review numerous documents and depositions in the cases styled: John Doe I vs. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, et al, Cause No. 93—09441-G, John Doe II & III vs. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, et al, Cause No. 94-07864-G, John Doe IV vs. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, et al, Cause No. 94-10091-G, John Doe I- XI v. Rudolph Kos, et al, Cause No. 93-05258-G, and Jane Doe I vs. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas, et al, Cause No. 94-07865-G. These documents and depositions have included the personnel files of Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr., Fr. William Hughes, and Fr. Rudolph Kos; the laicization file of Fr. Peebles; medical records regarding Fr. Peebles and Fr. Kos; and numerous documents and depositions, including depositions of the claimants, their families, and others in these cases. As a result of my review of the basic documents and discovery; and my background, training, experience, and research, I have arrived at a number of opinions which are outlined in this report regarding the various parties in these cases. I understand that discovery, especially as to the Bishops Conference and the Military Vicariate/AMS is not complete. Nevertheless, I have been asked to submit a preliminary report of my opinions and conclusions based on the information available to me at this time.

BACKGROUND/ EXPERIENCE/RESEARCH

3. After I was ordained in 1959 my first assignment was as a teacher and counselor in a parish high school. This assignment was my first introduction to parish life and the secret world of sexual activity on the part of some Catholic priests and religious despite vows of celibacy and chastity. I became immediately aware of sexual activity by priests and religious with both minors and adults. This revelation to me of a secret system concealing the lack of celibate practice among some Catholic priests and religious prompted my interest in counseling Catholic priests and religious. My work and research——which continues through the present time——expanded to include celibate/sexual practice of Catholic priests and its effect on lay adults and children. This research, experience, and observation form the basis for my opinions in these cases.4. In 1964 I received a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health and the Danforth Foundation to study pastoral counseling for one year at the Menninger Foundation.

5. From 1965 through 1967 I received a fellowship to study counseling and psychotherapy of Catholic priests and religious at Seton Psychiatric Institute, a Catholic-owned and operated hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. Seton Psychiatric Institute was established in 1844 and was the leading mental health facility in the United States for the treatment of Catholic priests and religious. Thousands of priests and religious from around the United States were referred by their bishops or religious superiors for treatment at Seton Institute for various psychiatric problems.

6. In 1967 I was hired at Seton Institute to head the Department of Family Services. I held this position until 1970 when I retired. From 1965 to 1970 I was involved in in-take conferences regarding each new patient, including numerous Catholic priests and religious who were referred to Seton to avoid criminal prosecution for sexual involvement with minors. Seton closed in 1972.

7. In the early 1950s, St. John s University, Collegeville, Minnesota established its Institute for Mental Health. This institute brought together prominent psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and Catholic clergy from all over the United States and, ultimately, nine foreign countries. I was Executive Director of the Institute from September 1, 1965 to August 30, 1969 (ancillary to my fellowship and employment at Seton) . I spent to 4-10 days per month at St. John s. In addition to 4—5 weeks each summer supervising workshops. During this time I was also designated personnel director of a 350 member religious community. St. John s was the premier Catholic facility in the United States for promoting the interaction between psychiatry and clergy. St. John s sponsored numerous one—week programs each year involving six psychiatrists and 40 clergymen of all faiths, although the largest proportion were Catholic priests and bishops. The psychoanalytic dimensions of problems involving clergy were frequently discussed in detail. Issues involving the sexual involvement of Catholic clergy with minors were a also a topic of conversation at these weekly programs, especially during staff conferences where the clinicians shared their experiences and case histories.

8. I have taught at three Catholic major seminaries——one of which is a Pontifical seminary- -from September 1, 1967 through June 30, 1984. I continue to give lectures on how to achieve celibate practice at Catholic seminaries, most recently from January 7 to 22, 1996. In April 1996, I published a manual for those who wish to practice a celibate lifestyle—- Celibacy: A Way of Loving, Living, and Serving. 9. I have been associated with a number of treatment facilities other than the Menninger Foundation and Seton Psychiatric Hospital. These include service on the Board of Directors of St. Luke Institute from 1986-1988 where both Fr. Rudy Kos and Fr. Robert Peebles were evaluated; Taylor Manor Hospital where I served on the advisory board; and the North Baltimore Mental Health Center where I served on the staff.

10. I hold an appointment at John s Hopkins University Medical School, Department of Psychiatry, as an instructor (part—time) from 1972 to the present time.

11. I lectured and supervised the psychiatric fellows in the Child and Adolescent program at Johns Hopkins University Medical School, Department of Psychiatry, from 1989-1993.

12. Beginning with my association with Seton Institute in 1965, I worked closely with experienced psychiatrists and psychoanalysts including my mentor, Dr. Leo Bartemeier, who had consulted with Catholic bishops and religious superiors for decades. I became acquainted with numerous case histories of Catholic priests and religious involving sexual activities with minors extending back to 1917. In 1965 Catholic bishops and religious superiors knew that sexual involvement with minors was a problem for some priests and religious. This topic will be explored in greater detail in other sections of my report.

13. Over the five year period of my association with Seton psychiatric hospital, I was personally aware of numerous formal and informal consultations with Catholic bishops and religious superiors from across the United States who were concerned about sexual activity of Catholic clerics with minors. The customary practice in Catholic dioceses and congregations across the United States when complaints of abuse were made was to transfer the priest out of his current position into another position of clerical service unless the situation came to the attention of civil authorities or threatened grave scandal. In these cases, the priests or religious were sent to a treatment facility, such as Seton, in order to avoid criminal prosecution and/or public exposure. In virtually all referrals to Seton Institute for sexual contact involving minors, the precipitating event was usually either a risk of public exposure or a court—related referral.

14. My research began in 1960 as the study of celibacy, and consequently, sexual activity of Catholic priests and religious; and my work continues as an effort to understand that dynamic. From this study, I was able to distinguish sexual activity with minors as a significant and unique sexual problem that involved repetitive behavior with multiple minors which resulted in tremendous negative consequences to the emotional health of the minor participant. This non-celibate behavior is radically different from sexual involvement with an age-appropriate partner which can lead to stable and consensual relationships. The Catholic cleric who was involved with minors generally had an age range of attraction which the minor eventually exceeded. The sexual acting out of the cleric also tended to be compulsive. These conclusions were apparent to me in the mid 1970s.

15. Dr. Leo Bartemeier cooperated with me in this work and research from 1964 through 1978. Based on our research work, our experience with patients, victims, religious superiors, and reports from colleagues , we estimated in 1976 that six per cent (6%) of all Catholic clerics acted out sexually with minors .

16. Over the years I have had a therapist/patient or consultative relationship with over 1,000 Catholic clerics and over 500 persons with whom Catholic clerics have acted out sexually. I have conducted extensive research, counseling, interviews and reviews of case histories of 2,700 sexually active clerics and 2,000 victims of sexual abuse by Catholic clerics.

17. My research and observation of sexual dynamics in the Catholic clergy has been national in scope, involving men and women from numerous dioceses and congregations. I have had broad national contact with Catholic clergy on the issue of mental health and pastoral care. This contact has included training programs on how to observe mental health problems in clergy. Five dioceses and five religious congregations were Particularly helpful in establishing the baseline for our estimates of sexual/celibate behavior of priests. While the specific individuals, dioceses-and congregations must remain confidential, we have used this research to verify our estimates and validate our opinions regarding the national picture of celibate practice among Catholic clerics, the extent of sexual involvement with minors, and efforts to conceal these facts from the public. My estimates of clergy sexual misconduct with both minors and adults are, in my opinion, conservative.

18. After I was ordained in 1959, I learned that some priests had sex with adults and even minors, and to some degree this behavior was taken for granted by church authorities. Yet, an atmosphere of crisis regarding this issue did not exist. The secret world of sexual activity, including sexual activity with minors, was known by the Catholic hierarchy, and though considered unfortunate and morally wrong, was accepted as an inevitable and easily forgivable failure of some priests. The atmosphere of crisis did not develop until years later when occurrences of sexual activity with minors became publicly discussed. Prior to wide—spread public acknowledgment, victims of abuse were silent and isolated. The primary objective of the Catholic hierarchy was avoiding scandal.

FIRST PHASE: THE INTERFACE OF PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE PROBLEMS OF CATHOLIC CLERICS

19. When I entered the priesthood, the sexual activities of supposedly celibate priests and religious was kept from the public by a closed system which I have referred to as the "celibate/sexual system." Clerics in a position of responsibility within the Church would be aware of sexual activity by Catholic clergy, including sexual activity with minors, because as bishop/superior/vicar, they were aware of complaints and would have to deal with problems as they arose. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when knowledge left the closed system it entered into the psychiatric system. Psychiatry and psychology were used to treat the offending cleric, contain scandal, and to placate the legal system if the cleric ran afoul of the law. Victims and their families were usually reassured by Church authorities and subsequently ignored. "Father is our problem and we will take care of the problem."

20. For the next 8-10 years, sexual problems of Catholic clergy were subsumed under the umbrella of other psychiatric problems, especially alcoholism. In fact, alcoholism was the first to be separated out and differentiated as a specific disorder afflicting clergy. (See article in Saturday Evening Post, circa 1953, and review the establishment of special alcohol treatment centers for priests.) Instances of sexual acting out were often causally related by history to excessive drinking .

21. Over time, psychosexual disorders were differentiated from alcoholism, depression, schizophrenia, and characterological disorders. This does not mean that the term "pedophilia" (and particularly not the term "ephebophilia") was in common usage. Certainly by 1976, the problem of Catholic clergy sexually acting out with minors was recognized as a serious mental illness.

22. The first public discussion of priest sexual abuse of minors was at a meeting sponsored by the National Association for Pastoral Renewal held on the campus of Notre Dame University in 1967. All American Catholic bishops were invited to that meeting.

23. In 1968 the newly formed National Conference of Catholic Bishops authorized a series of investigations of the priesthood in the United States which were published in 1972. These studies included Historical Investigations, Sociological Investigations, and Psychological Investigations. These investigations were quite detailed and extensive. I knew several of the consultants who were involved in the studies, including several who were associated with the Seton Institute and were professional colleagues of mine. These included Ivan Junk, M.D., Sara Charles, M.D., Marianne Benkert, M.D., and Leo Bartemeier, M.D. Fr. Eugene Kennedy, who was conducting the psychological study, was a frequent visitor to the Seton Institute .

24. The NCCB/USCC study concluded that 1/3rd of Catholic priests in the United States were under-developed emotionally, 1/3rd were developing, and 1/3rd were developed. These studies validated my observation of the emotional health and development of the priests and religious I had observed and treated at Menninger and Seton and in my therapeutic work and studies.

25. In 1977 an additional study, also by Fr. Eugene Kennedy, found that 57% of Catholic priests were underdeveloped, 29% were developing, 8% were maldeveloped, and only 6% were developed emotionally.

SECOND PHASE: THE ADVENT OF REPORTING LAWS

26. The secret system concealing sexual activities with minors on the part of Catholic priests and religious was first impacted in 1962 when the first reporting laws were passed. By 1968 virtually all states had reporting laws. In 1974 federal legislation mandating the existence of reporting laws in each state was passed. This does not mean that such offenses were reported or that Church authorities were mandated reporters in each state.

27. Although statutes had been passed in the 1930s and 40s criminalizing sexually acting out with minors, these laws were rarely activated until many years after the passage of statutes mandating the reporting of suspected sexual misconduct with minors.

28. The 1974 federal legislation which made reporting laws a mandatory requirement for the receipt of federal aid was significant to my practice. For the first time, this put pressure on psychiatry and psychology because it was the first outside intrusion into the confidentiality of the therapist/ patient relationship.

29. In 1976 the rise of the duty to report suspected sexual activity with children prompted Dr. Leo Bartemeier and myself to evaluate all of our available information in order to quantify the scope of the problem within the Catholic clergy. Dr. Bartemeier had been extensively involved in consultation with Church authorities since the late 1920s. Taking all of the available data into consideration led to our estimate that 6% of all Catholic clergy and religious acted out sexually with minors.

30. At the time Dr. Bartemeier and I made these estimates, the terms pedophilia and ephebophilia were not in common use and the official diagnostic manual for mental disorders saw them as part of an overall personality disturbance. This did not mean that professionals in the field and Catholic bishops and religious superiors were unaware of the behavior; it was simply referred to as sexual activity with minors.

31. In 1976, my specialty for 12 years had been counseling with Catholic priests and religious. I was also counseling with numerous lay patients who reported sexual involvement with Catholic clergy. The above estimate was an effort on the part of myself and Dr. Bartemeier to understand the scope of the problem.

32. In my years as a counselor and psychotherapist I have never treated both a priest and his minor victim. I have also taken care not to advise or treat priests or their minor victims if I had a conflicting relationship with the Diocese or congregation. In some instances I have treated a priest and his adult sexual partner with their consent.

THIRD PHASE: THE FUSION OF PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE OPENING OF CATHOLIC TREATMENT CENTERS

33. In the early the 1950s, Fr. Bier a Jesuit from Fordham University advocated psychological testing of candidates for the priesthood to eliminate problem priests, including those who acted out sexually. Fr. Bier s writings and advocacy of the use of screening tests reflected a growing awareness within the Catholic church that sexual behaviors by men professing celibacy were not merely expectable spiritual problems but contained psychological components as well.

34. Previously, if a priest had sex or fell in love these were considered ordinary and expectable moral/spiritual problems. The growing recognition of the psychological dimension of such moral/spiritual problems coincided with the opening of Catholic treatment centers, with the Jesuits training nine priest-psychiatrists within the U. S. Provinces, and the opening of training programs for novice masters and spiritual directors which took into account the psychological dimension of moral/spiritual problems.

35. In my own order, Thomas Verner Moore was the first Benedictine priest/psychiatrist. Fr. Moore founded the Department of Psychiatry at the Catholic University of America in the 1940s. Catholic University was the only university with a Department of Psychiatry without a medical school.

36. The second Benedictine priest/psychiatrist was Fr. Hayden who founded the Marselan Institute in Massachusetts in the 1950s. This psychiatric center was primarily for children with psychological problems. The Marselan Institute was the predecessor to St. Luke Institute. The Institute evolved from a treatment center for children into a treatment center for priests with behavioral problems. St. Luke Institute was also founded by a priest/psychiatrist, Fr. Michael Peterson. 37. The Hartford Retreat (formerly known as the Asylum) was opened in the 1822. This center is now known as the Institute of Living. In 1954 Dr. Francis Braceland became medical director of the Institute. Dr. Braceland was a devout Catholic and attended daily mass in the Institute s inter—denominational chapel. Dr. Braceland was vitally interested in the interface between religion and psychiatry and wrote a book on religion and psychiatry in the 1950s. Braceland also consulted widely with bishops and religious superiors about psychiatric problems in the priesthood and encouraged referral of problem priests to the Institute. Dr. James Gill, a Jesuit priest, was hired by Dr. Braceland. Dr. Gill was called in the case involving Fr. Peebles in 1984. Fr. "B" from Dallas was subsequently treated at the Institute of Living in 1994 after the Diocese received a complaint regarding his activities with a minor girl in 1981.

38. The Servants of the Paraclete opened their first spiritual retreat center in 1949 in Jemez Spring, New Mexico to care for problematic priests. I recall the opening of the renewal center in Nevis, Minnesota some time later. These were spiritual renewal centers founded on the concept of a monastic type spiritual retreat and initially did not incorporate psychiatric and psychological elements into their treatment programs. (In 1957 specialized treatment centers for priests with alcohol problems were set up as "Guest House.")

39. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of Catholic treatment centers specifically for priests and religious opened, all coinciding with a growing awareness among Catholic bishops and religious superiors that sexual and moral/ spiritual problems had psychological dimensions.

40. I was also aware of the opening of Southdown in Toronto in 1966, and the House of Affirmation in the early 1970s. I was very interested in these centers because of the incorporation of psychological and psychiatric elements into their spiritual treatment programs .

41. I observed that as these facilities opened, referrals of priests with sexual addictions increased. In my opinion, this increase did not occur because sexual behaviors by priests were new problems or because these facilities were opened for the express purpose of treating sexual disorders; rather, the psychological treatment of problematic priests highlighted the frequency of psychosexual disorders in the clergy. Cases of recurrent, troublesome, and undeniable sexual abuse compelled Catholic bishops and religious superiors to increase referrals to these new facilities.

42. Awareness of the dimensions of the problems presented by sexual addictions expanded as psychology and psychiatry broke through the barriers of secrecy as victims and perpetrators became willing to talk more openly about their experiences.

43. I also followed with great interest as the Servants of the Paraclete began to incorporate psychiatric awareness into their treatment of priests. They were particularly attuned to problems of a sexual nature. Awareness blossomed from a growing need to address a priest patient population which presented with compulsive sexual disorders reflecting arrested psychological development that could not be assisted by a spiritual retreat alone. Priests of the Paracletes began training in psychology and sexuality in San Francisco at the Institute for the Advanced Study of Sexuality in the early 1970s in order to prepare for the opening in 1976 of treatment programs to address psychosexual disorders.

44. I kept abreast of the development of the treatment programs called the Foundation House, Via Coeli, and Villa Martinez which opened over time, starting in 1976.

45. I personally visited the Paraclete program in 1981, interviewed staff, and examined the treatment program. I have known Fr. Michael Foley and Fr. Liam Hoare for some time and recently wrote a series of reflections on celibacy for their national newsletter. I respect what I saw of their work in 1981.

46. I want to re-emphasize that psychosexual problems of priests were not a new phenomenon in the mid 1970s. But awareness of psychiatric modes of addressing these problems was relatively new. The establishment of treatment centers afforded bishops and religious superiors an additional way to handle problems they had been dealing with all along within a more exclusive and secret atmosphere.

47. The existence of Catholic treatment centers and the types of treatment modalities available were widely known within the Catholic community and were used by bishops and religious superiors to refer priests for psychological treatment. These treatment centers included treatment regimes for psychosexual disorders involving minors. Promotional literature advertising these centers was sent out periodically to each bishop by many of the centers. The Paraclete treatment programs were well advertised, known, and respected.

48. In 1976 the Servants of the Paraclete opened what was perhaps the first program in the world with a treatment regime designed to treat psychosexual disorders including disorders involving the sexual abuse of minors. The ability of the Catholic community to design and implement such a program is both a reflection of the need for such a program and the degree of knowledge of the scope of the problem of sexual misconduct with children by Catholic priests and religious. The fact that preparations for the opening of this program were years in the making demonstrates wide—spread knowledge of existing sexual misconduct with minors by Catholic clergy by the late 1960s and early 1970s.

49. It should be noted that the Paraclete program treats only Catholic priests and religious on recommendation from their bishops or religious superiors. The bishop or religious superior is responsible for all treatment costs and is provided with periodic progress reports on the Catholic priest or brother patient.

50. From all available sources, and my work and research in the field, I have estimated that at least 1,300 priests and religious have been treated for psychosexual disorders involving minors in the past 25 years at a cost of over fifty million dollars

51. The Bishops Conference contributed money in the 1970s to the Paracletes to support the development of their program. Since the goals and purposes of the treatment program were well known within the Catholic hierarchy, the goals and purposes would have been known to the Bishops Conference as well. The Bishops Conference also issued directives regarding the retention or destruction of the treatment reports provided to the Bishops-- and the Paracletes and their staff followed these directives .

52. There is evidence that the Diocese of Dallas was well aware of the resources available in the Catholic treatment center network. They contacted Fr. James J. Gill, a Jesuit priest who is associated with the Institute of Living, in 1984 in regard to Fr. Peebles. Fr. Gill, who is a well—known Harvard—trained psychiatrist, has been giving workshops and seminars all over the world on psychological issues affecting clergy since the 1960s. Also, in 1986 Fr. Peebles was evaluated at St. Luke, in 1992 Fr. Rudolph Kos was a patient at the Paraclete Center in New Mexico, and Fr. "B" was a patient at the Institute of Living in 1994.

53. I conclude that the bishops of the United States, individually and collectively, were by the 1970s, well aware of certain psychological problems of priests, including sexual involvement with minors, and were also aware of alternative modes of addressing psychosexual problems other than spiritual renewal and geographic transfers.

FOURTH PHASE: VICTIMS OF PRIEST SEXUAL ABUSE/THE BISHOPS' RESPONSE

54. In the late 1930s, psychiatric research and writing began to acknowledge the harm of adult sexual activity with minors. This fact is reflected in the growing body of psychiatric writing on this issue. The advent of reporting laws in 1962 highlighted the growing awareness of the severe harm that sexual abuse of children engendered in the child victim.

55. Prior to 1966, even the National Catholic Welfare Conference (the organization that preceded the NCCB/USCC) had a Family Life Bureau. The purpose of this Bureau was to study family life, which would have included issues of premature adult-child sexual contact and the resulting trauma to children.

56. As early as the 1960s, Catholic bishops and religious superiors attempted to handle some of the more severe cases of sexual misconduct through the use of psychiatry and psychology. This effort grew in size, scope, and sophistication until by the late 1970s Catholic treatment centers were on the cutting edge of psychiatry and psychology in the use of sophisticated treatment techniques for the treatment of Catholic priests and religious who had acted out sexually with minors. It is reasonable to ask: what care was given to known child victims of priest sexual involvement? What steps were taken to protect Catholic children and their families from the known risk of future abuse?

57. In my practice I have treated victims of sexual misconduct by Catholic priests and religious and reviewed multiple case histories. Some patients report misconduct to Chancery Offices, bishops, and religious superiors. In response to their complaints, victims consistently report that they were seen as traitors and disloyal to their church. The victims felt that they were viewed as seducers, seductresses, sinners, or, in some cases, opportunists, and treated largely without sympathy .

58. As late as the early 1990s. an Archbishop stated that priests who got involved with minors were the naive victims of streetwise youngsters .

59. Although only a small percentage of parents or victims of sexual abuse exposed themselves to bishops and religious superiors, there were sufficient numbers who registered complaints so that the bishops had sufficient data to be aware of the victims, their pain, and the harm done to them. Complaints were discouraged because of the reception they received. The Dallas cases demonstrate inappropriate responses to complaints. Victims and their families were deceived, confused, ignored, not given credence, or discouraged. These families were inhibited by false, incomplete, and misleading information that would in effect serve the interest of the Church rather than the best interest of the child victim. This pattern is quite consistent in dioceses and archdioceses across the United States.

60. A victim is mistreated if, after he or she registers a complaint or allegation of abuse, Church authorities refer them to persons or agencies that will not deal with their complaints or problems objectively, or fail respond in the victim s best interests. The referral to Dr. McNamara in the Hughes case is one such example. Victims are mistreated if Church authorities enter into lengthy negotiations which go nowhere and often result in the victims and their families becoming discouraged; or if Church officials fail to act in a timely fashion to promote victims welfare. Victims and their families are mistreated if Church officials make false promises, impart false or incomplete information, or hold false hope of reconciliation or appropriate action. Examples of these patterns and practices are evident in each of the Dallas cases. Such mistreatment is consistent with my observation of the pattern in dioceses and religious houses across the United States.

FIFTH PHASE: THE SECRET SYSTEM IS BREACHED

61. The Louisiana cases came to public attention in 1985. These cases were unique because, for the first time, evidence of prior knowledge, in this case on the part of the Bishop of the Diocese of Lafayette, escaped the secret system and entered the public domain. Prior to 1985, there had been criminal prosecutions and lawsuits alleging sexual misconduct with minors by priests and religious, but evidence of prior knowledge did not leave the secret system. The Lafayette case was the first time the established practice for handling these cases by the Church became public. It is clear to me that the Catholic hierarchy in the United States, represented by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, acutely appreciated the significance of this type of public knowledge because the hierarchy (at the highest levels) became involved, including the General Counsel and Secretary General of the Bishops Conference and the Canonist from the Apostolic Delegate s Office. This involvement implies that the Catholic hierarchy was aware of the threat presented to the secret system by wide-spread public knowledge of the manner in which abuse cases had previously been handled. The media had been very reluctant to defy the hierarchy of the Catholic Church with any public exposure of malfeasance. This reluctance, to some degree, extended to religion in general. Ordinarily, Catholic bishops in their various countries had been able to control the media and even the civil courts. In the Lafayette case, such control was partially lost. Still, even in Lafayette, Louisiana, only a small part of the total clergy misconduct was ever made public; detailed knowledge by the public of the scope of the actual abuse was not wide—spread.

62. An independent Catholic media reported some details of the events in Lafayette. Exposure in this arena exerted more pressure on the secret system which had previously concealed priest sex abuse of children.

63. In 1992 a particularly egregious case of priestly sexual misconduct involving children was widely reported in both the print and visual media. A Catholic priest, James Porter, abused nearly 200 victims. This case also involved credible evidence of knowledge on the part of numerous bishops and other Church superiors: transfers to avoid scandal, lack of supervision, and active concealment of Fr. Porter s crimes. For the first time, some victims of abuse by other priests who became aware of the news coverage realized that they were not alone——their own experiences were similar to the publicly discussed events of the Porter case. This knowledge empowered some of these victims to come forward and discuss publicly their own experiences of abuse by priests.

64. In the period from 1985 to 1992, there was a growing sensitivity to the realization that Catholic bishops and religious superiors could be involved in concealing knowledge of criminal activities by Catholic priests and religious. A growing mass of people who had been violated began to share some of their experiences with psychologists, psychiatrists, spouses, parents, friends, and attorneys. Sharing created a body of hundreds of thousands of people who knew a reality that hitherto had not been publicly discussed. National exposure of evidence of on—going concealment of Porter s activities by numerous Catholic bishops led to the realization on the part of some victims and their families that they had perhaps been deceived by religious authorities in their dioceses as well. There is evidence of this dynamic and of such concealment on the part of the Dallas Diocese and NCCB/USCC in each of the Dallas cases and the Military Vicariate in two of the cases involving Fr. Peebles.

THE HARM TO VICTIMS OF PRIEST/RELIGIOUS SEXUAL ABUSE

65. It is well documented that the sexual abuse of a child is harmful to that child and distorts the child s normal psychological development. My work with abuse victims and review of the literature provides concrete support for this statement .

66. The sexual abuse of a child by a priest frequently develops gradually and presents several complicated features: 1) the sexual contact arises from a relationship involving immense trust on the part of the minor; 2) the child is extraordinarily vulnerable in that the priest is seen as an agent of God; 3) an affectionate relationship often precedes the sexual contact so that the child feels that he (usually) or she has a very special relationship to the priest; 4) there is an incredible helplessness on the part of the abused child-—most abused minors either feel responsible for the abuse occurring, or so powerless that they feel they cannot disclose the abuse to their parents, and often, to anyone else; 5) such secrecy surrounds the abuse that disclosure is inhibited—— sometimes reinforced by threats——which allows the abuse to continue; and 6) if the abuse is revealed, the child victim is rarely handled in a responsible, pastoral manner by bishops. Moreover, the parents trust in their bishop permits manipulation, intimidation, and, in some cases, active deceit, with negative consequences to the welfare of the child.

67. Effects of abuse can sometime be seen immediately by trained professionals in the form of depression, moodiness, withdrawal, or acting out, but the origins of distress are very difficult to distinguish without competent professional assistance. Many times, the effects are quite subtle and become clarified only in retrospect.

68. The long-term effect of sexual abuse on children can be pervasive and debilitating when certain conditions are present in the abuse dynamic. These pervasive and debilitating effects have been discussed in case histories and studies presented in psychiatric and psychological literature for many years prior to the events giving rise to the Dallas litigation. Bishops and religious superiors and their advisors in the field of psychology and psychiatry knew and could appreciate, by the 1970s in my opinion, the harm resulting to a child victims of abuse by a trusted priest or religious .

69. By 1982, individuals possessing child pornography were designated more serious offenders and distinguished from others possessing pornography involving adults. Recently, three Catholic priests were among a group of 45 men arrested in a (1995/96) FBI sting for receiving child pornography. One was sentenced to ten years in prison. Another anticipates a 12 to 18 month sentence. The third case is pending. The case of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) also reviewed the literature in the area of child sex abuse and acknowledges the longstanding awareness in professional and legal circles of the harm to children from such abuse.

70. In 1984 and 1985 Fr. Michael Peterson of St. Luke Institute, Fr. Thomas Doyle, a Canonist at the Papal Nunciature, and Mr. Ray Mouton, a civil attorney representing Fr. Gilbert Gauthe, prepared an extensive report on the civil, canonical, and psychological aspects of priest sexual involvement with children. This report included well-documented statements regarding the long-term harmful effects to a child victim of sexual abuse. In September, 1993 the Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse of the NCCB admitted that this report identified virtually the same issues that had previously been analyzed for the bishops.

71. In 1985 David Finkelhor, Ph.D., and Angela Brown, Ph.D., digested what was known from the previous research into a powerful model that left no doubt about the potential for long-term harm to child sex abuse victims. The interplay of four dynamics are known to be active ingredients in the sexual abuse of children by priests and religious. The atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the response of bishops/superiors/vicars/ priests to the notice of abuse accentuated the dynamic of victimization. These dynamics include: traumatic sexualization, stigmatization, betrayal, and powerlessness. Each of these dynamics are evident in the Dallas cases and are causally related to the extensive harm documented in the Plaintiffs' psychological profiles. See Table 1 (attached), Traumagenic Dynamics in the Impact of Child Sexual Abuse, from the Finkelhor/Brown article. 72. It is mystifying that the Diocese of Dallas continued to refer abuse victims and perpetrators to professionals who either had conflicting alliances with the Dallas Diocese (Dr. McNamara) or who were denied the information necessary to render an adequate and objective diagnosis (Dr. Jaeckle and St. Luke Institute) .

COMPONENTS OF THE SECRET SYSTEM- -SEXUAL ACTIVITY
BY PUBLICLY CELIBATE PRIESTS AND RELIGIOUS

73. Celibacy, the state of non-marriage and the practice of perfect chastity, is a requirement for ordination to the Catholic priesthood in the Latin Rite. (Canon 277) . The Catholic bishop is mandated to supervise and assure compliance with this requirement. Celibacy is an on-going requirement for the active priesthood. This amounts to a certification that any active Catholic priest is sexually safe. The bishops, religious superiors, and their media operations in the United States have assiduously fostered this image and assumption .

74. Indeed, what an unassailably noble ideal celibacy is: characterized by complete devotion to God, free from all ambivalence, a living symbol of the universality and meaning of divine love and complete availability and devotion to the service of humanity. I have no quarrel with the concept and pursuit of the celibate ideal.

75. Certainly, the vast majority of Catholic priests do not sexually abuse minors. But, because the consequences of the abuse of a child by a person holding spiritual power is so dire and long—lasting, even a small proportion of perpetrators within ministry is a matter of extreme public interest and urgency. Moreover, the fact that such abuse occurs in other parts of society does not lessen the need for responsible action by Catholic bishops in the United States in regard to their own priests, bishops, and lay members of their church.

76. As I stated above, by 1976 Dr. Bartemeier and I were able to estimate that 6% of all Catholic priests and religious involved themselves with minors. If we could know, I believe the bishops knew as well.

77. Fr. Andrew Greeley, a priest sociologist from the Archdiocese of Chicago, has estimated that between 5-7% of Catholic priests involve themselves sexually with minors.

78. Various other sources estimate the percentage of all Catholic priests who involve themselves sexually with minors from 2% to 10% . There is some confusion as to whether these figures refer only to pedophiles (sexual involvement with pre—pubescent children), ephebophiles (sexual involvement with adolescents), or to both. I estimate that 2% of all Catholic priests are pedophiles and that an additional 4% involve themselves with adolescents (ephebophiles). 79. When individual Catholic institutions or dioceses are considered, the proportion of those alleged or indicted for the sexual abuse of minors frequently runs higher than my estimates. For example, several Catholic dioceses in the United States reveal that over 10% of active priests have been sexually involved with minors.

80. An extensive study of a California minor seminary (student ages 13-17) was conducted in 1993 by an independent review board consisting of religious and lay professionals in the field of social work and psychology, law and medicine. This study showed that 25% of the religious faculty (Franciscan Friars) had inappropriate sexual contact with minor students over a twenty-three (23) year period.

81. A similar pattern of misconduct was documented in a midwestern minor seminary (student ages 13—17) between the years 1968-1986 when fourteen (14) victims complained about sexual abuse by six priest faculty members. Additional complaints were registered against three priest members of the faculty between 1972 and 1992. My study suggests that only a small proportion of abusing priests or religious within any given community or area ever come to public notice, even when efforts at discovery and disclosure are maintained. The secret system surrounding priests and bishops is very protective and well established.

82. My studies reveal that sexual abuse within seminaries by priest faculty is significant because 10% of clergy report having been sexually abused during their course of study for ordination .

83. Sexual abuse is not a problem unique to the Catholic priesthood in the United States. In Canada, the Catholic Archbishop of Newfoundland established an independent commission to study the long—term sexual abuse of minors in one of its institutions. The Newfoundland study revealed that 13 of 107 priests were involved in sexual activities with minors. An additional 23 religious brothers and employees of the church were also implicated. The published report, which was completed in 1990, was the springboard for reforms initiated by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and implemented in dioceses across Canada.

84. A 1991 study of a random sample of Catholic clergy in South Africa revealed that approximately 45% of priests reported being sexually active with an unspecified partner within the previous two years. This study was conducted by a Catholic priest, Victor Kotze.

85. A 1995 study of priests in Spain alleges that 7% of all priests have committed grave sexual offenses against minors. The same study reports that of a sample of 354 priests who were sexually active, 26% acted out sexually with minors. Overall, the author claims that 60% of all Catholic priests in Spain are sexually active.

86. In 1996 the Irish Conference of Catholic Bishops, in a written statement, pledged full cooperation with police and civil authorities to bring known perpetrators in the Catholic priesthood in Ireland to justice. The Irish Conference also apologized to the lay Catholic community for its long—standing failure to respond to notices of the abuse of children by Catholic priests in Ireland.

87. The Australian Conference of Catholic Bishops in May 1996, acknowledged similar problems with Catholic clergy in Australia and issued a policy statement concerning cooperation with an investigation announced by a Royal Commission. Notice was read in each parish in Australia.

88. As I have explained in other sections of this report, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the United States, as exemplified by the bishops, archbishops, cardinals and other members of the Bishops Conference of the United States, has known of this problem for some time. As I have explained, I estimate that 2% of all Catholic priests are sexually involved with prepubescent children (pedophiles) and 4% of Catholic priests are sexually involved with adolescents (ephebophiles) . Well established studies show that the average pedophiles has 250 or more victims over his lifetime. We do not have the same studies available for ephebophiles. Fr. Andrew Greely estimates that there are between 100,000—150,000 victims of sex abuse by Catholic priests and religious in the United States. In my work, I have never attempted to make an estimate of victims.

89. The evidence of the widespread sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy in the United States is only one indication of the lack of celibate practice among Catholic clergy. Four times as many Catholic priests and religious are involved with women than are involved with children, and nearly three times as many are involved with adult men.

90. A separate problem within the Catholic priesthood is the issue of homosexuality, particularly in light of the Church s condemnation of homosexual practice. Knowledgeable observers, including authorities within the Church, estimate that 40-50% of all Catholic priests have a homosexual orientation and that a majority of these are sexually active. From my studies, I estimate that only 30% of Catholic priests have a homosexual orientation and that only half of these are sexually active. See Lothstein, 34 Catholic Law Rev. 89 (1994) .

91. As of 1980, there had been no published studies regarding the sexual behavior of Catholic priests serving in public ministry. In 1980, a dissertation study of homosexual priests was conducted by a Catholic priest at the Institute for Advanced Study of Human Sexuality. The final sample involved 50 gay Catholic priests from across the United States ranging age from 27 to 58 years. Of the sample, only two of the 50 priests, or 4%, were currently abstaining from sex. The number of previous same-sex partners for the sample population revealed an average of 227 same—sex partners per survey participant, ranging from 11 participants who reported 500 or more partners to 9 who reported no more than 10. A total of 49, or 98% of the survey sample stated they intended to continue in a gay lifestyle in the future. In addition, 88% stated that, in spite of their sexual activity, they would again take a vow of celibacy.

93. The large number of sexually active homosexual priests further complicates the issue because of the potential for public controversy and disapproval of this behavior, particularly in view of the Church s own disparagement of homosexual orientation as an "inherently disordered condition."

94. The question of homosexuality is sometimes confused with the issue of sexual abuse of minors because of the disproportionate number of male minors who are victims of priest sexual abuse. Some clinicians report that 90% of priests' sexual victims are male. I have found that priest victimize boys at least twice as often as girls. Whatever the ratio, it is clear that priest molest minor boys proportionately more frequently than abusers in the general population. See Lothstein, 34 Cath. Law Rev. 89 (1994) .

95. It is my opinion that the need to maintain secrecy, to control public knowledge of the sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clerics, to avoid prosecution for such crimes, and to protect the reputation and finances of the Catholic Church has led to what the Dallas plaintiffs term "a conspiracy" of the bishops and religious superiors to conceal these crimes against minors Through this "conspiracy", bishops strove to avoid decisive and responsible action because of fear of scandal, and in spite of the known risk of harm to the welfare of the Catholic minors who were at risk. Secrecy in the face of knowledge of the risk of harm to children is not only reprehensible, it is potentially illegal.

DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE NEGLIGENCE OF VARIOUS DEFENDANTS

96. I am conversant with the role and responsibility of the Bishops Conference (Defendants NCCB/USCC) with regard to priestly training and formation as a result of having taught in several major Catholic seminaries since 1967. The Bishops' Conference has been very active in establishing binding guidelines for seminary training, in the certification and evaluation of seminary faculty and students, and in establishing standards to be met by seminary students and faculty. The Bishops Conference was also active in commissioning studies on priestly formation and training.

97. I am also conversant with the role of the Bishops Conference in establishing, coordinating and executing national policy on behalf of the Catholic church on issues impacting Catholic life in the United States. In this regard, the Bishops Conference is the Catholic entity which coordinates and directs research efforts on issues of interest to Catholic life in the United States.

98. I am also well aware of the media operations of the Bishops Conference including Catholic News Service, the largest Catholic news agency in the world, their publication, Origins, and the numerous pastoral plans, pastoral letters, and other statements expressing the policy of the Catholic Bishops of the United States which the Bishops Conference issues and which speak directly to the lay Catholic community throughout our nation.

99. In my opinion, the NCCB/USCC was responsible for and negligent in the following respects:

a) failing to acknowledge and warn the Catholic public of the danger to minors arising from the known propensity of some Catholic priests and religious to act out sexually with children.

b) promulgating national standards for priestly training and formation that did not adequately address the need to identify seminarians who——because of their own psychosexual immaturity--were at risk for non-celibate behavior and so were not suitable for a public ministry involving minors.

c) failing to establish and implement a national policy involving an informed, supervisory laity; prominent is the absence of any plan to prevent sexual activity with minors by Catholic priests and religious.

100. I am also conversant with the role of individual Catholic bishops in the United States. Each Catholic bishop is responsible for the safety and welfare of the lay Catholic community within his diocese. The diocesan bishop has the authority to control and direct all Catholic activities within his diocese, including the ordination, assignment, supervision and discipline of all Catholic priests and religious within his diocese and his power to excommunicate those within his jurisdiction who do not conform.

101. In my opinion the Bishop of Dallas, and his delegates, were negligent in the following respects:

a) the failure to investigate numerous reports, complaints, rumors, red flags, and other clear indications of a substantial risk to children from sexual misconduct with minors on the part of Fathers Peebles, Kos, Hughes, and other priests.

b) the repeated assignment of Catholic priests to positions involving access to Catholic children when such clerics were unsuitable for such assignment without proper supervision or warnings to Catholic parents and children.

c) the repeated failure to properly supervise the activities of Fathers Peebles, Hughes, and Kos despite clear notice that the activities of these clerics presented a substantial risk of harm from inappropriate, immature, or even illegal sexual misconduct with minors.

d) the failure to implement proper warnings and instructions to Catholic parents and their children despite the known risk of sexual misconduct with minors on the part of priests of the Dallas Diocese.

102. The Military Vicariate/Archdiocese for Military Services is a diocese, like the Dallas Diocese, and is headed by a bishop who has the authority to endorse Catholic priests and religious as suitable candidates for military service. This endorsement to the Department of Defense warrants that the priest candidate is morally, spiritually, intellectually and emotionally qualified to represent the Catholic faith and to serve as an officer in the United States military.

103. In my opinion the Military Vicariate was negligent in the following respects:

a) in failing to conduct an adequate investigation of Fr. Robert Peebles qualifications to serve as a reserve officer in the United States Army in 1981.

b) in failing to conduct an adequate investigation of Fr. Robert Peebles qualifications to serve as an active duty officer in the United States Army in 1982.

c) in endorsing Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr. in 1981 as qualified to represent the Catholic faith as a reserve military officer when he was a sex offender and abused alcohol at the time of the endorsement.d) in endorsing Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr. in 1982 as qualified to represent the Catholic faith as an active duty military officer when he was a sex offender and abused alcohol at the time of the endorsement.

e) in failing to conduct an investigation following the incident at the Galilee Retreat House in June, 1982 when Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr. appeared with an underage boy who shared sleeping quarters with Fr. Peebles at a time when Fr. Peebles was under the supervision and direction of bishops and agents of the Military Vicariate.

f) in failing to advise the United States Army in 1981 that the endorsement of suitability for active service issued in January, 1981 was fraudulent because Fr. Peebles was a sex offender and alcohol abuser unsuited to wear the uniform of an officer of the United States army.

g) in failing to advise the United States Army in June of 1982 that the endorsement of suitability for active service issued in February, 1982 was fraudulent because Fr. Peebles was a sex offender and alcohol abuser unsuited to wear the uniform of an officer of the United States army.

104. It is my opinion that the cases involving Fathers Peebles, Hughes, and Kos fit a nationwide pattern that I have observed over the last 35 years. This pattern involves knowledge of ongoing sexual misconduct by Catholic priests and religious and cooperation among bishops to keep such misconduct from becoming public knowledge. Such a pattern is found in all dioceses and religious orders in the United States and perhaps in many countries in the world. The cases involving Fathers Peebles, Kos, and Hughes also fit the pattern I have observed in terms of the method of operation of the priest, the knowledge of the diocese, the diocese s response, and (in the Peebles cases) the cooperation among bishops in the assignment of the offending cleric and in the bishop s response to evidence of sexual misconduct with minors on the part of the offending cleric. I do not believe that it is accidental that these cases are handled in the same way in dioceses and religious orders throughout the United States. The following are uniform practices: failing to investigate indications of any sexual misconduct, even with children; failing to properly supervise the cleric in his assignment; failing to ensure that the cleric is prosecuted for misconduct with children. Once an incident occurs energy and policies at the highest levels of Church authority have been directed to damage control, avoidance of scandal at all costs, and efforts to placate and manipulate victims and families. The latter often involves intimidation, misleading information, and even fraudulent means, if necessary. Policy also involves maintaining the priest in a new assignment without proper supervision and without informing the congregation where the abusive behavior usually continues.

105. This common pattern is strong evidence of an agreement on how to handle these cases and a plan to achieve the desired result, i.e. the avoidance of public knowledge and accountability for illegal sexual misconduct by Catholic priests and religious with minors. Another publicity tactic is to minimize priest/Church involvement when abuse becomes public. For instance, Church representatives claim that priest molest less than other groups. Other public relations ploys to avoid accountability involve manipulation and intimidation of the media, claiming "Church bashing," "priest bashing," or "Catholic bashing" at any revelation of priestly malfeasance, trying to discredit those reporting the malfeasance. It is my opinion that the conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs does in fact exist and preceded the events in Dallas. This conspiracy is not only negligent but reprehensible, and may involve some criminal behavior as well.

106. Of particular significance to the Dallas litigation is the fact that each and every plaintiff in these cases were either known or knowable to the Dallas Diocese, and, where John Doe I and IV (Peebles) are concerned, to the Military Vicariate. The bishops and their psychiatric and psychological advisors knew or should have known that these victims required assistance in order to mitigate the harmful effects of sexual abuse by a trusted spiritual advisor. The Dallas Diocese and the Military Vicariate did nothing to assist the claimants in these cases, and instead took actions which increased the harm to the victims. It is my opinion as a psychotherapist that the harm to these victims continued through the years and was increased and made chronic by the actions of these defendants.

DIOCESE OF DALLAS

107. In the Dallas Diocese there is a well-established pattern of knowledge and damage control by keeping violations secret, even though the diocese is aware of the misconduct. This pattern includes:

a) knowledge of sexual misconduct by Fr. "E" in 1966 by the Vicar General which did not result in investigation or supervision with the result that Fr. "E" went on to abuse additional minors.

b) reports of unspecified misconduct on the part Fr. "A" in 1967.

c) notice of homosexual misconduct with boys on the part of Rudy Kos prior to his admission to the seminary in 1976.

d) knowledge of Fr. Robert Peebles violations by at least 1980 with numerous subsequent notices of violation to the Dallas Diocese and the Military Vicariate (John Doe IV brought to retreat house in 1982, rape of boy in 1984, re—offense in 1986).

e) knowledge of Fr. "B's" activities with a minor girl in Irving, perhaps as early as 1981.

f) a consistent pattern of pedophilic behavior on the part of Fr. Rudolph Kos throughout his ministry from 1981 through 1992.

g) reports of possible sexual misconduct with minors on the part of Fr. "C" and Fr. "D" in the mid to late 1980s.

h) covering up the diocese s prior knowledge of Fr. "B s" misconduct in Irving in 1981 by advising this claimant in June of 1993 that no one in the Dallas Diocese had any inkling of this behavior when it was known by the Bishop, Vicar General, Business Manager, Superintendent of Schools, and at least two pastors and a school principal prior to June of 1993 according to deposition testimony by the Superintendent of Schools.

MILITARY VICARIATE

108. A similar pattern is evident in the behavior of the Military Vicariate in that I have been shown evidence of a consistent pattern of endorsing Catholic priests and religious as suitable to serve the Catholic faith in the military who had a prior history of sexual misconduct with children. I am also aware of a pattern of allowing the Catholic chaplains to resign their commissions rather than face Court Martial. This pattern existed prior to to the Peebles case.

RAY K. MCNAMARA, PH.D.

109. In my opinion Dr. McNamara assisted the diocese in the cover—up regarding the victims of both Hughes and Peebles in that Dr. McNamara had a dual relationship with the Dallas Diocese at the time of his advice to and treatment of John Doe I in the Peebles case and Jane Doe I in the Hughes case. Because of this dual relationship, Dr. McNamara should not have advised or treated either plaintiff. In reviewing Dr. McNamara s deposition and treatment records, I see no evidence that he appropriately diagnosed and treated these individuals. Finally, Dr. McNamara s admission that he destroyed original treatment records which are important to this case in August, 1993 was in my opinion done to conceal material information and furthered the "conspiracy" concerning the concealment of the crimes against children on the part of Fathers Peebles, Kos, Hughes, and numerous other priests of the Dallas Diocese, some of whom had been treated by Dr. McNamara. Some of my further observations and opinions are as follows:

a) As to the Hughes victim, Dr. McNamara perpetuated the cover-up by failing to serve her interest vs. that of the Dallas Diocese.

b) Dr. McNamara was coopted into the system of avoiding scandal. He did this by failing to foster the victim s freedom of choice. Knowing about the abuse from the parental interviews, there is no evidence he dealt with it with his patient. By doing this, he fell within the secret system of avoidance and perpetuated the victimization and the cover up. Is his avoidance conditioned by his allegiance to the Diocese? Does his involvement constitute a conflict of interest? A collusive dual relationship proscribed by therapist/ patient ethical practice? I believe it does based on the 1981 APA Standards.

c) As to the Peebles victim (Doe I--Peebles), there seems to be a pattern of conflict when it comes to priests of the Diocese. For instance, McNamara treated the family of a victim, the victim and the perpetrator without disclosing this conflict. He also was treating other priests of the Diocese, receiving referrals from the Diocese, and consulting with the Tribunal, including Fr. Fellhauer (the Bishop s agent in the Peebles matter), again without disclosing this conflict.

d) Dr. McNamara, regarding Doe I, again failed to discuss the nature and extent of the sexual abuse of the victim and there is little evidence that he adequately assessed the victim s needs and best interests. At the same time, he was receiving counseling referrals from the diocese and being financially subsidized by the Diocese. He should not have become involved in this case.

e) The record demonstrates that Dr. McNamara made the judgment that John Doe I (Peebles) not be permitted to testify against Robert Peebles. The record also reflects that parents adopted that judgment, assuming that it was from an unbiased third party when in fact Dr. McNamara had a long-standing relationship with the Diocese that was not disclosed and a dual relationship and conflict of interest in this matter.

f) Dr. McNamara also failed to take the victim s needs into account and take direct measures to make sure the victim received needed therapeutic support despite the fact that he continued to treat the victim s family until 1987.

g) The parents allege that Dr. McNamara counseled the family not to keep pressuring John Doe I (Peebles) to discuss the molestation; if true, such advice effectively fosters secrecy to the detriment of the victim.

h) It appears that Dr. McNamara s advice was followed in that the molestation was kept secret, even within the family, and not discussed in any depth until December of 1992. What was Dr. McNamara s role in this?i) This pattern of events reflects the attempt of the system to coopt agencies, including mental heath agencies and legal agencies, into the secret system and for the avoidance of scandal. This pattern is consistent with the nationwide pattern I have observed. These efforts fail when the victim is empowered and the facts can no longer be contained within the secret system. Psychotherapy should empower victims to speak up, even in the media and in the Courts, when appropriate. In my opinion, Dr. McNamara made repeated attempts to silence victims and conceal wrongdoing——contrary to the best interests of his patients——in the service of the secret system.

j) There is no evidence that Dr. McNamara ever reported Fr. Peebles or Fr. Hughes to the proper authorities although he was a mandatory reporter.

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF FR. WILLIAM HUGHES

110. Hughes is an example of arrested adolescent development where the natural attraction of a 26 year old man is to a 12—13 year old girl because this is his age emotionally. Why was this not discovered/monitored nor support provided by Religious system?

a) Before Abuse is Discovered:

(1) Father of girl becomes suspicious when he observes daughter rubbing Hughes back (before sexual conduct starts) . This was discounted by Mother and ultimately by Father because Hughes was a priest and "priests are celibate." There are other warning signs also. (Proper warning from Diocese and NCCB would have prevented abuse.)

(2) No registration at parish of Hughes' pattern of behavior although girl is calling all the time; she is seen with priest and priest spends all his time with family and girl. Hughes behavior was obviously observed by the pastor. Fr. Clayton commented to Fr. Kos about Hughes practice of being at St. Luke s School when school let out. This coincided with his activities concerning Jane Doe I. It should be noted that there is also possible evidence of similar behavior on the part of Fr. "E". (denial/lack of supervision). No investigation is conducted.

(3) Typical seduction pattern by priest involves winning the trust of the family.

(4) CLUE: Jane Doe s brothers observe the relationship between the priest and Jane Doe——"he s not here to see us, he s here to see Jane Doe." This is another indication that a proper warning would have prevented the abuse. But such a warning is incompatible with the image of the priesthood that the Church wants to project .

(5) Systemic failure to study problem and to prevent sexual misconduct——and provide the tools for proper supervision and to give lay people the tools to protect themselves; priests presented as completely safe .

Emphasis was on preventing scandal and covering up misconduct in order to preserve image. This amounts to a deception.

(6) Also before abuse: the Church system that fosters denial and refuses to acknowledge sexual reality and impropriety, including sexual conduct with children, deprives a Pastor of the tools and support to process information, even if he recognizes what is occurring (denial/lack of warning)

b) While abuse is occurring:

(1) Hughes misses 6:00 mass a number of times because he and Jane Doe oversleep in his room (denial/lack of supervision)

(2) Hughes spends inordinate amount of time with one family and one girl; no registration by parish. Housekeeper finds nude photo. Denial/lack of supervision. No investigation is conducted.

c) After the abuse is discovered and unavoidably exposed, what occurs:

(1) The family is drawn the secret system; they call Fr. Cloherty, asking "Who do we see if we think a priest is in love with a little girl?" He responds "come see me." A meeting is held at the Chancery office (becomes a secret place) . According to the testimony of the parents they arrive with two shopping bags of love letters.

(2) Priest advises parents to keep it quiet (this is disputed fact but the testimony of the parents fits the national pattern) .

(3) Priest disposed of the evidence (this is disputed fact but the testimony of the parents fits the national pattern).

(4) Church refers parents to Dr. McNamara with whom the Church had an ongoing relationship.

(5) Parents placed great trust in Diocese officials.

(6) Church deflects family attention from the issue of the sexual abuse of child and instead focuses on preventing scandal for the good of the church.

(7) Parental consultation with the highest officials in the Diocese, i.e. Vicar General and Bishop, is met with resistance and denial amounting to a cover up. (Vicar General says "prove it."). No investigation is conducted.

(8) The systematic promotion of some priest violators insures secrecy within system. Hughes, a known child abuser, is appointed to the priest personnel board in 1989.

(9) Fr. Hughes is never prosecuted.

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF FR. ROBERT R. PEEBLES, JR.

111. Prior knowledge:

a) Peebles demonstrated serious characterological problems in the seminary by the dichotomy between his intelligence and performance and his erratic academic record. Faculty reported poor interpersonal relationships, especially with people his own age.

b) Peebles revealed a concern over poor impulse control when he was in the seminary. (Problems with chronic masturbation)

c) Problems evidenced from seminary with interpersonal relationships .

d) There is a record of negative recommendations before ordination, including a statement by one pastor who had a "spooky feeling". No investigation is conducted.

e) Peebles manifested a classic Borderline Personality Disorder——which was not properly diagnosed or treated until after multiple incidents of abuse

112. Knowledge after Ordination:

a) A parent has suspicions of inappropriateness that he conveyed to Fr. Scott while Peebles was assigned to St. John s in Ennis. Fr. Scott advises Vicar General of rumors of sexual misconduct with boys during camp-out (time frame unclear but probably by 1980). The son had in fact been abused but no investigation conducted and boy never identified or assisted.

b) Fr. Peebles method of seduction consistently involves alcohol for both himself and for minor boys, along with tobacco. He traps boys into secrecy to cover up "their" behavior from their parents.

c) Peebles is caught abusing a boy at St. Mark s and "agrees to counseling to avoid prosecution." Peebles at St. Mark s from 1979-1981. Told military investigator he was caught in 1981 at All Saints. No investigation is conducted .

d) In 1981, Peebles is struggling and is involved sexually with adolescents. Vicar General "notices he is depressed" and recommends counseling, recognizing Peebles distress. Permission is given to enter Military Reserves. No investigation is conducted.

e) In 1981, Diocese inexplicably and unjustifiably appoints Peebles as Director of Scouting.

f) Peebles appointment as Director of Scouting conforms to a pattern of systemic cover-up. The public image fostered is that he can t be a child abuser because we would never appointed him as Diocesan Director of Scouting .

g) Bishop has conversation with Dr. McCandlish in 1981 (who is treating Peebles) about the subject of whether a child abuser would repeat behavior.

h) Peebles advised McCandlish in 1981 of inclination to abuse boys. What was done? Was a report made to authorities?

i) In 1981 when Peebles is endorsed as spiritually, morally, intellectually qualified to be an officer in U.S. military reserves and Catholic Chaplain, there is evidence that this endorsement is fraudulent in that he is abusing children and alcohol.

j) Military Chaplaincy offers a great latitude of life style operation; greater than diocese.

k) In January, 1982, Peebles advises a Retreat Director of fact he is out of control and abusing boys. "Don t worry about harming boys, boys will bounce back". No investigation is conducted.

1) February 1982, permission is given for Peebles to enter active military. This endorsement is also fraudulent.m) At Chaplain training retreat under control and supervision of Military Vicariate in May-June, 1982, Peebles presents himself in the company of a young boy with whom he billets under the open observation of Catholic military Vicariate officials. Subsequent failure to investigate is negligent.

n) Although there was notice of Peebles behavior, undeniable evidence of sexual acting out is presented when abused boy confronts military police in March of 1984 and Peebles confesses. Now the diocese (and Vicariate) are forced to do something because of heightened threat of scandal.

o) Peebles is sent for psychiatric help and diagnosed as borderline personality disorder; the 1984 incident Peebles reports as isolated. A real effort at help or damage control and containment of scandal? Indicated by the manner in which the boy and parents were handled by the Diocese of Dallas and the Catholic chaplain (Fr. Ortiz)?

p) Several Catholic systems cooperated to avoid scandal. Chaplain Michael Ortiz was given statements from the boy and Peebles and responsibility to contact boy s parents and coordinate his return to Dallas. Parents were not notified and boy remained alone and unaided in a Catholic parish house for 1 1/2 days while Peebles prepared his request to resign from military as part of the maneuver to avoid court martial. Even after confessing to military authorities that he abused John Doe I, Peebles is observed saying Mass by the military investigator, John Greely.

q) The maneuvers to avoid criminal prosecution required Military Vicariate (Chaplain Ortiz), Fr. Fellhauer (Dallas Diocese) and Dr. Ray McNamara to divert the efforts of the family and the victim in favor of the perpetrator to avoid scandal and protect the church. This is a typical pattern.

r) The force of these maneuvers were so well coordinated and "practiced" that they could subvert and bypass superior military authority consisting of a Major General in charge of a major command and all U.S. Ground Forces Worldwide who was determined to court martial this admitted rapist. This demonstrates the facility, power and operation of the secret system as it interlocks between a particular diocese (the Dallas Diocese), the Military Ordinariate, and a coopted mental health provider, Dr. McNamara. Dr. McNamara "evaluates the victim" and convinces parents not to allow victim to testify.

s) Peebles is reassigned to his own Diocese, under Dr. McNamara s treatment, and continues as before.

t) The victim was used--"don t scandalize the Church"——with the result that victimization is perpetuated again.

u) Fr. Peebles goes on to abuse three more victims in 1986 under the sponsorship of the Bishop of the Dallas Diocese .

v) Fr. Peebles is never prosecuted.

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF RUDOLPH KOS

113. Prior Knowledge:

a) The Diocese had notice that Kos had a sexual interest in children before he entered the Seminary. No investigation is conducted.

b) The NCCB, by signing off on Kos annulment, insured that Kos could enter the Seminary and be eligible for Ordination. It is for other experts to assess the legality of the annulment but this approval was a causative factor in Kos becoming a Catholic priest.

c) There was information available from his brothers and his wife that Kos was a child abuser from an early age, had abused his own brother and that a pattern of behavior was observed indicating that his abuse of children was fixated even during marriage. No investigation is conducted .

d) Complaints of Kos sexual behavior were brought to the attention of the Vicar General prior to his ordination but the Vicar General insisted that Kos would nevertheless be ordained. This is typical of the secret system, in that they know but do not act. No investigation is conducted.

e) Kos actions from the moment he receives a parish assignment are those of a fixated pedophile and are within the view of the Chancellor of the Diocese, who raises no complaint. Kos also serves with Peebles and Hughes in 1982 (receives permission?). No investigation is conducted.

f) In spite of the fact that Kos questionable behavior was documented over days and weeks by the pastor of his next assignment and the assistant pastor at St. John s, those reports were completely ignored for seven years, from 1985—1992. No investigation is conducted.

g) In spite of these reports, and concrete evidence of financial irresponsibility, Kos was promoted to pastor in 1989.

h) His pedophilic behavior became the subject of reports by ‘the new assistant pastor in 1991 but these reports were not effectively dealt with. Instead, the Diocese referred Kos to a Psychiatrist, Dr. Jaeckle, who had no experience in treating sexual abusers and the Diocese also failed to advise the psychiatrist of the preceding behavior and its documentation.

i) In May of 1992, Kos history is presented to a psychologist experienced in cases of sexual abuse of minors. Based on this history, the diagnosis was "classic Pedophile" and recommendation was to remove and expect complaints .

j) Kos was sent by the Diocese to St. Luke Institute in June, 1992 but Kos past history was not fully shared with the staff at St. Luke.

k) Kos was removed only after a victim threatened litigation in September, 1992 and Kos confessed to some abuse.

1) Kos statement to Dr. Jaeckle, "why are they harassing me when all these other priests are doing it too?" indicates the broad knowledge of improper sexual activity within the system.

m) Particularly troubling is the extent to which the secret system is being preserved by Fr. Kos whereabouts not being known while substantial personal expenses were being paid. Raises the question of who is really being protected. Fr. Kos is not the only priest whose location was unknown during relevant times.

n) The Kos case is a manifestation of the unraveling of the secret system where the exposure of one priest leads to the exposure of many more whose activities were known by the system but concealed from the public.

o) The pattern of concealing the existence of perpetrators is not only local but national. The rudiments of this system were first manifested by moving a priest abuser from one parish to another or one locality to another. (Example: James Porter, where six different Bishops were ultimately aware of his crimes against children before he was removed from the priesthood.)

p) As the secret system has unraveled, transfers were no longer adequate so perpetrators have to be protected through the use and manipulation of the medical and legal system in more dramatic ways in order to avoid further scandal.

CONCLUSION

114. I believe that the Bishop of Dallas, and the bishops of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops/United States Catholic Conference employed traditional methods of a system of secrecy to conceal wide—spread evidence of sexual misconduct with minors by Catholic priests and religious which was known to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and concealed from the Catholic public. This concealment included the making of ambiguous, false, and misleading statements concerning the behavior of Catholic priests and religious when it was known that a significant number were involved with illegal sexual misconduct with minors. This illegal misconduct with minors was so wide—spread and well—known that it resulted in the maintenance of a number of Catholic therapeutic centers devoted to the treatment of Catholic priests and religious. The recommendation of a bishop or superior was required for evaluation or hospitalization, which presumes that superiors had foreknowledge of the sexual abuse involved in these cases. In fact, the Servants of the Paraclete opened the first treatment center in the world in 1976 with a program to treat this very disorder. Yet this material information was not conveyed to the Catholic public for the safety of Catholic children.

115. The bishops of the Military Vicariate were also involved in secret system to conceal material information in that they were a part of the system of assignment of Catholic priests and religious who were known to engage in sexual misconduct with minors.

116. The Diocese of Dallas concealed information concerning the propensity of Fathers Peebles and Kos to act out sexually with minors despite ample notice of this misconduct.

117. Dr. Ray McNamara concealed his dual relationship with the Dallas Diocese. This relationship appears to have compromised his judgment with resulting harm to the best interests of John Doe I in the Peebles case and Jane Doe I in the Hughes case.

118. Dr. McNamara s destruction of the original treatment record in August, 1993 appears to be an act in furtherance of this conspiracy to conceal material information regarding the sexual misconduct of Catholic priests with minors. The Judicial Vicar s letter to an abuse victim in June, 1993 claiming no knowledge of Fr. "B s" activities also appears to aid a conspiracy to conceal material information concerning sexual misconduct of Catholic priests with minors. This was not simply a conspiracy to conceal the negligence of these defendants but to conceal illegal actions as well in that many of these crimes against children were never reported to the appropriate authorities by Dr. McNamara and the representatives of the Diocese of Dallas. I have not examined the reporting laws in the State of Texas to determine whether the Diocese of Dallas was a mandated reporter at that time.

I am aware, however, that such reporting laws require reporting by "any person" and that the sexual abuse of both girls and boys below the age of 17 was a crime in the state of Texas at the time that the abuse in these cases occurred. Dr. McNamara seemed obligated to report Fr. Hughes in September, 1984 and perhaps Fr. Peebles in May of 1984 and August of 1986. His deposition indicates he did not do so. This behavior furthered the goals of a cover—up.

119. I will reserve my discussion of the claims of gross negligence and malice until my final report.