SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
LAW DIVISION, CRIMINAL PART
MERCER COUNTY, NEW JERSEY
DOCKET NO. SGJ-MCJ-1-21
A.D. #

IMO THE STATE GRAND JURY ) OF
)
DECISION

Place: Mercer County Criminal

Courthouse

400 South Warren Street

Trenton, NJ 08608

Date: May 25, 2023

#### <u>SEALED TRANSCRIPT</u>

#### **BEFORE:**

THE HON. PETER E. WARSHAW, JR., J.S.C.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

GREGORY G. GIANFORCARO, ESQ. (Gianforcaro Law Firm)

#### **APPEARANCES:**

ROBERT MERINO, Special Deputy Attorney General CLAUDIA J. DEMITRO, Deputy Attorney General MALLORY SHANAHAN, Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for the State

LLOYD D. LEVENSON, ESQ. (Cooper Levenson)
JENNIFER B. BARR, ESQ.
JAMES J. GODINO, JR., ESQ. (McKernan, McKernan & Godino)
Attorneys for the Diocese of Camden

Transcriber, Mary Polito

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC. 268 Evergreen Avenue

Hamilton, NJ 08619

(609) 586-2311

FAX NO. (609) 587-3599

E-mail: jjcourt@jjcourt.com Website: www.jjcourt.com

Audio Recorded

Audio Operator, Bell Provost

### APPEARANCES (Cont'd):

STEVEN P. GOODELL, ESQ. (Parker McCay, P.A.) MICHAEL E. SULLIVAN, ESQ. Attorneys for the Diocese of Trenton

#### TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES:

MELISSA F. WERNICK, ESQ. Attorney for the Diocese of Metuchen

MICHAEL CRITCHLEY, ESQ. (Critchley, Kinum & Luria, LLC)

Attorneys for the Archdiocese of Newark

JOHN P. LACEY, ESQ. (Connell Foley) Attorneys for the Diocese of Paterson

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you all for being punctual. We're on the record in a matter which is being addressed under seal. It's a State Grand Jury matter. It's In re the State Grand Jury. The docket number is SGJ-MCJ-1-21. That docket number was assigned by the Retired Assignment Judge Mary Jacobson when she started to deal with this matter.

Counsel, would you enter your appearances, please?

MS. DEMITRO: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Claudia Demitro on behalf of the State.

MS. SHANAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Deputy Attorney General Mallory Shanahan also on behalf of the State.

MR. MERINO: Good afternoon, Judge. Robert Merino, Special Deputy Attorney General on behalf of the State.

MR. LEVENSON: Lloyd Levenson, Cooper Levenson, on behalf of the Diocese of Camden.

MS. BARR: Jennifer Barr with Cooper Levenson on behalf of the Diocese of Camden.

THE COURT: I apologize, counsel. Finish.

MR. CRITCHLEY: Michael Critchley on behalf
of the Archdiocese.

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 $\,$  MR. GOODELL: Steve Goodell from Parker McCay on behalf of the Diocese of Trenton.

MR. SULLIVAN: Also, Michael Sullivan from Parker McCay on behalf of the Diocese of Trenton.

THE COURT: And, sir in the back, are you entering an appearance?

MR. GODINO: Yes. James Godino of the Diocese of Camden.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, Mr. Critchley entered his appearance.

Mr. Lacey?

MR. LACEY: John Lacey of Connell Foley on behalf of the Diocese of Paterson.

THE COURT: Ms. Wernick, please.

MS. WERNICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Melissa Wernick from Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi on behalf of the Diocese of Metuchen.

THE COURT: Okay, I think that's everybody. Thank you all for your patience. The record will reflect that some people are here in person. The Attorney General's Office is here in person and the Camden Diocese and the Trenton Diocese are here in person. The Archdiocese in Newark appears virtually as does the Diocese of Paterson and Metuchen.

Thank you, all. I appreciate your

accommodations. We tried to get this scheduled. I appreciate your patience. I know this took me a very long time to get done and, you know, I've addressed that. I apologize for how long it took, but that's the way it is.

I'm getting ready to place my decision on the record. I expect it's going to be lengthy. If anybody needs a break, just raise your hand, tell me that you need a break, signal somehow. I'll try to take one in the ordinary course though.

Before I place the decision on the record, does anybody need to be heard as to anything?

(No audible response)

THE COURT: No? Okay, everybody is good. I'll place the decision on the record.

On or about September 6 of 2018 New Jersey Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal announced the formation of a task force to, quote, investigate allegations of sexual abuse by clergy in Catholic dioceses in New Jersey, end quote. This announcement was accompanied by a press release which delineated the Attorney General's intentions. The press release is part of the record in this matter but this Court feels it is important to specifically review certain portions of the release.

The release is captioned AG Grewal Establishes Task Force to Investigate Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Clergy in Catholic Dioceses of New Jersey. Beneath the headline it says Former Acting Essex County Prosecutor Robert D. Laurino will lead the task force and there's a phone number there for a new New Jersey clergy abuse hotline.

The Court is not going to read the entirety of this but I am going to read the first several paragraphs. Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal today announced that he is forming a task force to investigate allegations of sexual abuse by members of the clergy within the Catholic Diocese of New Jersey as well as any efforts to cover up such abuse. Attorney General Grewal has appointed former acting Essex County Prosecutor Robert D. Laurino to head the task force.

An experienced sex crimes prosecutor, Laurino will oversee a team of detectives and prosecutors from across the state's county prosecutor's office and the Division of Criminal Justice and will report directly to DCJ Director Veronica Allende. Attorney General Grewal has authorized the task force to present evidence to a State Grand Jury including through the use of subpoenas to compel testimony and the production of documents in addition to other investigative tools.

To help identify potential victims, Attorney General Grewal has also established a new dedicated hotline to report allegations of sexual abuse by members of the clergy. The hotline will be staffed by trained professionals and operate on a 24/7 basis. The toll free number is 855-363-6548.

Today's announcement follows the recent publication of a report by a Pennsylvania Grand Jury alleging more than 1,000 victims of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic priests in that state over a 70-year period. The report which was the result of a multi-year investigation led by Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro also detailed allegations of a coverup by church leaders and accusations of sexual abuse against at least four priests who spent part of their ministries in New Jersey.

I was deeply troubled to read the allegations contained in last month's Pennsylvania Grand Jury report, said Attorney General Grewal. The report revealed that sexual assaults on children and efforts to cover up such assaults were far more widespread in Pennsylvania than we ever thought possible. We owe it to the people of New Jersey to find out whether the same thing happened here. If it did, we will take action against those responsible.

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No person is above the law and no institution is immune from accountability, continued Attorney General Grewal. We will devote whatever resources are necessary to uncover the truth and bring justice to victims. I commend Attorney General Josh Shapiro for his investigation in Pennsylvania and we will work to ensure that our investigation in New Jersey is done professionally and thoroughly.

The next paragraph contains a quote from Mr. Laurino which is part of the record which I don't need to read into this record now.

The next paragraph of relevance is that it reads in addition to investigating allegations of sexual abuse by clergy, the task force will conduct a comprehensive review of existing agreements between the Catholic Dioceses of New Jersey and state law enforcement. In 2002 each of the state's dioceses entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Attorney General's Office and various county prosecutor's offices.

These MOUs mandated that the dioceses establish policies and procedures to ensure that their leaders and employees report information to prosecutors about potential cases of sexual abuse within their churches and cooperate in any resulting law enforcement

investigations. As part of the efforts announced today, the task force will determine whether the dioceses complied with the MOUs' mandatory reporting requirements and whether any additional action is necessary.

The balance of the release contains certain statements by the director of the Division of Criminal Justice at the time and some statements concerning Mr. Laurino which are also part of the record but need not be read now.

The task force, as indicated in the press release, includes at least one attorney and at least one county detective from the 21 county prosecutor's offices. Members of the Division of Criminal Justice participate in this task force as well. According to the State, after the task force was formed, the clergy abuse hotline was established. Trained professionals are available to answer the hotline 24 hours a day, seven days a week and at the time briefs were written in this case, the hotline was reported to have received over 550 calls.

These calls are said to have reported sexual abuse, physical abuse and mental abuse by clergy dating back to the 1940s. Allegations have also been made as to specific action by church officials to conceal

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 misconduct including moving priests from one parish to another and in some cases, promoting clergy who were alleged to have raped or molested children.

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The task force has said to zealously and diligently pursue every received tip in an effort to bring justice to victims many of whom have never had their voices heard or allegations investigated. At the time of briefing and oral argument the task force's efforts had led to the arrest of four individual clergy. The State was understandably reluctant to discuss the pending investigation or future plans to charge.

The State did say that further indictments were not being ruled out and that the potential charges included broad-based conspiracy and racketeering charges. The State asserted that because acts committed outside the statute of limitations can prove the existence and continuance of a conspiracy, even decades-old conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations may be relevant to potential criminal charges; <u>United States v. Jake</u>, 281 F.3d 123 (2002), <u>State v. Cagno</u>, 211 N.J. 488, 510 (2012).

The Court is advised that after the Attorney General formed and announced the task force, there was a meeting convened with counsel for the five Roman

Catholic Dioceses in New Jersey. These included the Archdiocese of Newark and the Dioceses of Paterson, Metuchen, Trenton and Camden. The task force is said to have disclosed its purpose and intention which specifically included subpoening relevant documents from the diocese. Counsel agreed to cooperate.

Thereafter, on or about October 1 of 2018 the State Grand Jury issued a subpoena to the diocese requiring the production of records. A return date was set and the dioceses were advised that personal appearances before the Grand Jury would not be required if the appropriate documents were produced.

The subpoenas or at least some representative subpoenas are part of the record but I do think it's important to very broadly review the subpoena. The subpoenas do vary depending upon the recipient but I just think it's important for the record to get an additional flavor of what this is and the subpoena I'm referring to is one that was forwarded by letter dated October 1, 2018 to His Eminence Cardinal Joseph W. Tobin of the Archdiocese of Newark and that was forwarded by Assistant Attorney General Annmarie Taggart.

The schedule to the subpoena lists 11 different items. Importantly, it is extremely broad.

I'm not going to read all of this into the record but, for example, the first thing in Schedule A is any and all files, records, forms, notes, documents, materials, digital data, digital or electronic records or statements related in whole or in part to allegations of sexual abuse of children and adults, physical abuse of children and adults, sexual contact or penetration of children and adults as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1, whether or not the act was determined to be consensual or non-consensual or material related to any other crime by priests, monsignors, bishops, cardinals, nuns, teachers, deacons or any current or former clergy or employee of the Archdiocese of Newark from January 1, 1940 until the present day. There's a request for personnel files for certain individuals going back to the same January 1, 1940 date.

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And that's the theme of the subpoena. The subpoena, it's thorough, it's detailed and it's carefully drafted. And the purpose of this subpoena is to cover a very substantial period of time going back to January 1, 1940 extending through the date the subpoena was issued. This is a period of almost 79 years for which the State sought information.

The State agrees that the dioceses collectively provided hundreds of thousands of pages of

relevant documents but asserts that there was not full compliance. The State asserted that it has regularly requested the production of specific documents including evaluation and treatment records for priests and other clergy members accused of sexual abuse. The State is certain such reports exist.

It appears to the Court that the parties worked collaboratively to try to resolve the compliance issues. The State's position is that by September of 2020 the Dioceses of Paterson, Metuchen and Trenton were in substantial compliance. On or about September 25 of 2020 the task force entered into an agreement with the Archdiocese of Newark that the evaluation and treatment documents would be limited to, (a) those priests or deacons who were referred to evaluation or treatment upon an accusation of sexual abuse, and (b) those records of alcohol or substance abuse treatment where the victim has alleged that he or she was provided with such a substance as part of the abuse.

The task force offered the same agreement to the Diocese of Camden. On or about January 11 of 2021 counsel for the Diocese of Camden advised the task force that it objected to the production of the records. The parties continued to negotiate without resolution.

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As such, on or about April 21 of 2021 the Attorney General obtained an order to show cause directing the Archdiocese of Newark and the Diocese of Camden to explain why they should not be directed to produce documents required by the subpoena under penalty of contempt.

On April 23 of 2021 now Retired Assignment Judge Mary C. Jacobson, A.J.S.C., entered an order in connection with these matters and this order is part of the record. And what Judge Jacobson did was she noted that initially when she received the pleadings, she had established a briefing schedule for the relief that was sought in the order to show cause and at that point the counsel for the Diocese of Camden contacted Judge Jacobson's staff to raise the possibility of a conflict of interest that could require recusal of Judge Jacobson from handling the order to show cause and from any further involvement relating to the issues delineated in the order to show cause.

Judge Jacobson took that matter under advisement and she considered the concerns that were raised by counsel for the Camden Diocese and she decided to recuse herself from the order to show cause and from any further judicial involvement in the ongoing investigation. She did not require a formal

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motion to do this.

Judge Jacobson having made that decision, transferred responsibility for supervision of this entire issue to me in my capacity as presiding criminal judge in Mercer County. So, Judge Jacobson's order of April 23rd constituted her recusal and her referral of the matter in its entirety to me.

On or about May 3 of 2021 the Camden Diocese responded to the State's order to show cause by challenging the Grand Jury's authority to bring a presentment concerning clergy abuse. The arguments advanced by the diocese include that there is no authority for a presentment under New Jersey law and that such a presentment would violate the establishment clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.

In a letter accompanying its filed brief regarding the State's order to show cause the Camden Diocese requested that the Court consider the issue of whether a Grand Jury presentment would be permissible concerning a religious institution before it addressed the issue of subpoena compliance. This Court over objection from the Attorney General agreed that it was appropriate for the Court to do so.

And before I go any further, I do want to

thank the parties for the very high quality of the briefs that were submitted in this case. I think I did it at oral argument. I'd like to do it again. Briefs were submitted by the Camden Diocese and the State. They were extremely good. They were thorough, detailed and interesting as were the voluminous appendix materials that were provided. I really appreciate the high quality of the work that was done here.

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The Camden Diocese argued that there is no Constitutional authority, no legislative authority and no court rule based authority for the State to proceed with this anticipated Grand Jury presentment. The Diocese further argued that the anticipated Grand Jury presentment intends to address decades-old occurrences in contravention of the requirements that any censured public harm be imminent. The Diocese also argued that specific authority exists in Pennsylvania for the type of presentment issued by the Pennsylvania Grand Jury. And finally, the Diocese argued that this type of Grand Jury presentment would violate the establishment clauses of the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution.

The State argues that the challenge to the anticipated Grand Jury presentment is premature since no presentment has been offered by a State Grand Jury.

The State asserts that this motion is an inappropriate attack on the Grand Jury's subpoena. The State further argues that a Grand Jury may issue a presentment on any matter of public concern and that clergy abuse is a matter of public concern. The State further argues that the scope of a presentment need not be confined to government officials, government institutions and regulated commercial entities and there is no imminent harm requirement for a Grand Jury presentment.

Article I Section 8 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense unless on the presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury except in cases of impeachment or in cases now prosecuted without indictment or arising in the army or navy or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger.

A Grand Jury's authority to issue a presentment originated in the 1844 Constitution. New Jersey Statute 2B:22-1, et seq. pertains to the State Grand Jury. N.J.S.A. 2B:22-1 requires that there be at least one State Grand Jury with jurisdiction extending throughout the state serving at all times.

At the time of oral argument and I believe presently there are five State Grand Juries sitting,

one on each day of the week. The Attorney General and the director of the Division of Criminal Justice have the ability to request the impanelment of additional State Grand Juries and that's what's occurred here, a sixth State Grand Jury has been requested.

State Grand Juries have the same powers and duties as County Grand Juries except that they have state-wide jurisdiction, N.J.S.A. 2B:22-2(a). The statute further recognizes that the Supreme Court may promulgate rules to govern particularly the procedures of State Grand Juries, N.J.S. 2B:22-2(b). This statute goes on to delineate how a State Grand Jury is to be selected, that's at 2B:22-3, and also how it's to be summoned, that's at 2B:22-4.

N.J.S. 2B:22-5 provides that the judge designated by the Chief Justice shall maintain judicial supervision over the Grand Jury. All indictments, presentments and formal returns of any kind made by a State Grand Jury shall be returned to the designated judge. N.J.S.A. 2B:22-6 is captioned return of indictment or presentment but the statute itself says nothing about presentments. The word presentment is not defined in the State Grand Jury enabling statute.

The statute authorizing County Grand Juries or the statutes authorizing County Grand Juries are

found in N.J.S.A. 2B:21-1, et seq. These statutes are similar but not substantively identical to the State Grand Jury statutes. The word presentment does not appear in the statute.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has issued comprehensive rules concerning the operation of County and State Grand Juries. These rules are contained from Rule 3:6-1 through Rule 3:6-11. Rule 3:6-9 pertains to the finding and return of a presentment.

This rule finds in Subsection (a), a presentment may be made only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors. It may refer to public affairs or conditions, but it may censure a public official only where that public official's association with the deprecated public official is intimately and inescapably part of them.

Subsection (b) reads, a presentment shall be returned in open court to the assignment judge who shall be notified in advance thereof by the foreperson so that the Judge may arrange to be available in court to receive it.

Subsection (c) of that same rule is captioned examination referenced back striking and it reads as follows. Promptly and before the Grand Jury is discharged the Assignment Judge shall examine the

presentment. If it appears that a crime has been committed for which an indictment may be had, the assignment judge shall refer the presentment back to the Grand Jury with appropriate instructions.

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If a public official is censured, the proof must be conclusive that the existence of the condemned matter is inextricably related to non-criminal failure to discharge that public official's public duty. If it appears that the presentment is false or is based on partisan motives or indulges in personalities without basis or if other good cause appears, the Assignment Judge shall strike the presentment either in full or in part.

As an aid in examining the presentment, the Assignment Judge may call for and examine the minutes and records of the Grand Jury with or without the aid of the foreperson or the prosecuting attorney to determine if a substantial foundation exists for the public report.

If the presentment censures a public official and the assignment judge determines not to strike, a copy of the presentment shall forthwith be served upon the public official who may, within ten days thereafter, move for a hearing, which shall be held in camera. The public official may examine the Grand Jury

minutes fully, under such reasonable supervision as the court deems advisable, and be permitted to introduce additional evidence to expose any deficiency.

Subsection (d) pertains to filing and publication and it reads such portions of the presentment as are not referred back to the Grand Jury for further action or are not stricken in accordance with Paragraph (c) of this rule shall be filed and made public, and the assignment judge shall instruct the clerk of the Grand Jury to send copies thereof to such public bodies or officials as may be concerned with the criticisms and recommendations made therein and to the Administrative Director of the Courts.

The presentment or any portion thereof shall not be made public by any person except the assignment judge. The assignment judge shall withhold publication of the presentment until the expiration of the time for the making of a motion for a hearing by a public official pursuant to R. 3:6-9(c), and if such motion is made, shall withhold publication of the presentment pending the judge's determination.

Finally, Subsection (e) is captioned Review and it says the action taken by the assignment judge pursuant to this rule is judicial in nature and is subject to review for abuse of discretion by the State

or by any aggrieved person, including any member of the Grand Jury making the presentment.

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Now, as regards the case law here, the parties agree that certain decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court provide an important historical foundation for the decision that the Court has to make here. One such case is <u>In the Matter of the Presentment made to the Superior Court of New Jersey Camden County</u> by the Camden County Grand Jury on or about October 11, 1951. The cite there is 10 N.J. 23 (1952), and this is referred throughout the pleadings and in argument as Camden-1.

This presentment concerned the operation and management of the Camden County Jail and catalogued numerous irregularities. Several indictments alleging misconduct in office were returned as were indictments alleging other criminal offenses. The Grand Jury also presented a lengthy report to the Camden County assignment judge on its investigation of irregularities at the jail.

The Grand Jury's report contained a series of specific recommendations for future management and operations of this county-run facility. The Camden County sheriff moved to have defamatory portions of the Grand Jury's presentment expunged from the report and a

Camden County assignment judge ultimately issued the presentment.

The brief that was submitted in this matter by the Camden Diocese refers to this Camden-1 decision as, quote, a historical and Constitutional tour de force, that's Page 6 of their brief. And this is an apt description and it's not my intention to try to fully summarize the Camden-1 opinion but I want to look at several concepts that are key concepts that were discussed in the opinion.

One of the things Camden-1 does is recognize the important role that a Court with oversight responsibility over the Grand Jury has and this is necessary to ensure that justice is done and that the public welfare is to be safeguarded, Camden-1 at Page 33.

The term presentment, according to Camden-1, has long been employed to designate the findings of a Grand Jury with respect to derelictions in matters of public concern, particularly of officials which may fall short of being criminal offenses. This type of presentment differs from the obsolete criminal presentment in that it does not lead to a trial but merely notice to the offender, that's Camden-1 at 35.

And Camden-1 delineates a variety of

presentments that occurred beginning at Page 35 of the opinion and running through Page 59. And the opinion observes that as one reads these presentments, the conviction rose that they have been a great force in bringing about many substantial improvements in public affairs which otherwise would have been long delayed. There can be no doubt that the use of Grand Jury presentments to call attention to public abuse was consistently recognized under the 1844 Constitution, Camden-1 at Page 59.

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Camden-1 recognizes that Grand Jury presentments serve a need that is not met by any other procedure. At Page 66 the opinion states the Grand Jury provides readily-available group of representative citizens of the county empowered as occasion may demand to voice the conscience of the community.

There are many official acts and omissions that fall short of criminal misconduct and yet are not in the public interest. It is very much to the public advantage that such conduct be revealed in an effective official way. No community desires to live a hair breath above the criminal level which might well be the case if there were no official organ or public protest. Such presentments are a great deterrent to official wrongdoing. By exposing wrongdoing, moreover, such

presentments inspire public confidence in the capacity of the body politic to purge itself of untoward conditions. Again, this is Camden-1 at Page 66.

Camden-1 further notes that the chief objection to the Grand Jury presentment of public affairs is that a public official or even a private citizen who is in some way associated with public affairs may have charges proffered against him which he has not been afforded an opportunity to answer. The Supreme Court recognized this concern and observed that the possibility exits but it notes that at that time it was not infrequent for persons to be named in indictments without their being indicted. Again, that's Page 66 in Camden-1.

Camden-1 recognizes, as well that the acceptance of a presentment of public affairs, unlike that of an indictment, is not a ministerial act. The acceptance by the court of a presentment of public affairs is a judicial act, Camden-1 at Page 67.

Another important precedent is <u>In the Matter</u> of the Presentment made to the Superior Court of New <u>Jersey Camden County</u> by the Camden County Grand Jury 1959 term, first dated session on or about June 7, 1960. This is 34 N.J. 378 (1961) and the parties refer to this decision as Camden-2. The case concerned

illegal gambling in the City of Camden, and the connection it may have to the City of Camden's Police Department. The Grand Jury prepared a presentment which was issued and distributed by the assignment judge. A substantial portion of the presentment was directed at the Mayor of Camden who also served as the director of Public Safety. This individual moved to expunge certain portions of the presentment.

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The Supreme Court in Camden-2 made important statements regarding the history of the presentment in New Jersey. Camden-2 notes that originally, presentments were delivered to the appropriate Court after knowledge of criminal activities had come to a Grand Jury's attention through its own independent investigation or study or otherwise, but without the intervention of the prosecutor and without any action or recommendation on his part in pursuit of an indictment. The presentment then served to call the criminality to the notice of the proper authorities and to authorize or request the preparation of an indictment. It operated as an accusation upon which the prosecutor was ordinarily expected to act.

The practice grew and evolved for Grand Juries to make an occasional report concerning comments or criticisms on the state of public affairs or

conditions in a particular area or on a matter of general interest. It was a written communication, an impersonal broadside according to the case, calling attention to matters of public concern but charging no crime and reciting no facts upon which an indictment could be framed, Camden-2 at Page 388.

Camden-2 expressly states that reports of the presentment type have been held to serve a valid purpose. When discreetly used, they are regarded as serving a public purpose if they refer to public affairs and conditions, and even if they occasionally censure public officials whose association with the deprecated public affairs or conditions is intimately and inescapably a part of them, Camden-2 at 389.

The Court went on to note that it was in connection with the censure of public officials that such presentments most frequently come under attack. The Court recognized the fundamental reason for imposing restraint upon the privilege of a Grand Jury to hand up a presentment reprobating a public officer by name or inescapable imputation where no evidence warranting indictment for crime has been submitted to it.

The Court recognized that when an indictment has been returned, the official becomes entitled to a

trial. He has an opportunity to face his accuser and to achieve public exoneration from a court or jury. Not so with a presentment. It castigates him, impugns his integrity, points him out as a public servant whose official acts merit loss of confidence by the people, and it subjects him to the odium of condemnation by an arm of the judicial branch of the government, without giving him the slightest opportunity to defend himself. Such a presentment unless thoroughly justified is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial document; yet it lacks the principal attribute of a judicial document, the right to answer and to appeal.

It accuses, but it furnishes no forum for a denial. No one knows upon what evidence the findings are based. An indictment may be challenged even defeated. The presentment is immune. It is like the hit and run motorist. Before application can be made to support it, it is the subject of public gossip. The damage is done. The injury it may unjustly inflict may never be healed, Camden-2 at 390, and I'm not giving the other citations.

To recognize complete freedom in Grand Juries to censure public officials when at the same time they acknowledge a lack of evidence on which to indict is to confer on them the absolute right to establish their

own standard of right and wrong and of public and private morality, and to impose those standards on such officials without any responsibility for their abuse. Such freedom would subvert the very principle they were created to protect, Camden-2 at 390.

Camden-2 found that Camden-1 provides support for reprobatory presentments related to public affairs and matters of general public interest even though officials connected therewith or said to be responsible therefor are incidentally identified by name or otherwise. The proposition is acceptable that a Grand Jury may investigate conditions or offenses affecting the morals, health, sanitation or general welfare of the county, as well as county institutions, buildings and departments, and make presentments concerning them, Camden-2 at 390 and 391.

Camden-2 says the plain implication of Camden-1 is that the subject of the presentment must be a matter of general public interest or relate to some aspect of public affairs, or to some public evil or condition to which, in the discretion of the jury, the intention of the community should be directed. And censure of a public officials is permissible only where it may be said with absolute certainty that his connection with the condemned matter is such that its

existence is inextricably related to non-criminal failure to discharge his public duty, Camden-2 at 391.

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More particularly, the criticism of the individual is allowable only where it is integrally associated with the main purpose of the report, to draw critical attention to some undesirable condition in the affairs of the public, Camden-2 at 391.

The presentment cannot be used to single out persons in private or official positions and impugn their motives, or by word or innuendo hold them to scorn or to censure. It cannot simply accuse, and by the device employed compel the accused to stand mute. The jury cannot forage at will upon any whim it may entertain. The probability of damage to the reputation of public officials far overshadows any benefit the public might receive from such unlimited license, Camden-2 at 391.

The parties also reference <u>In the Matter of the Presentment made to the Superior Court of New Jersey Monmouth County</u> by the Monmouth County Grand Jury on or about May 2, 1956, 24 N.J. 318 (1957). This case was decided between Camden-1 and Camden-2. A Monmouth County Grand Jury sought to return two presentments to the assignment judge. One concerned the sale and publication of obscene and indecent

literature and the other suggested that municipal courts be authorized by legislation to hear and determine cases involving desertion and non-support.

The assignment judge refused to file the presentments and ordered them stricken. The Grand Jury appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the assignment judge's decision and ordered that the presentments be filed and published.

Of importance to this matter, the Supreme Court noted that the practice of Grand Jury is to investigate, make inquiry, take testimony and render reports springs from the common law right when it related to matters affecting the public interest and general welfare. The Court notes that a Grand Jury, of course, cannot forage at will upon anyone it may entertain. Its expression must be limited to matters imminent and pertinent relating to the public welfare and of the ultimate benefit to the community served by the Grand Jury, and this is the Monmouth case at Pages 324 and 325.

Other decisions concerning presentments and form the issues before the Court; In re Presentment to Superior Court, 14 N.J. Super. 542 (Law Div. 1951), concerned an application by commissioners in the City of Hoboken who sought to expunge all or part of the

Grand Jury's report. Generally, this report concerned whether the Police Department was protecting or suppressing gambling operation investigations.

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In reviewing the matter, the Law Division noted that the Grand Jury was a creature of common law constitutionally authorized to proceed by presentment or indictment. It was noted that sometimes a Grand Jury makes a written report to the Court which is not intended to be followed by an indictment. This is not a true common law presentment but the practice has existed for Grand Juries to consider methods of administration of municipal government and to point out where there are defects or where improvements may be made.

The Court opines that much can be said of this custom. Such reports commenting on or condemning general conditions which the Grand Jury finds to exist can do no harm but may be followed by beneficial results to the community for the reason that the recommendations of a Grand Jury, an arm of the court, carry great weight in the public mind.

Conceding that criticism of public officials raises questions of public interest just as truly as a report concerning conditions, nevertheless, it is contrary to fair play and sound public policy when in

such a report the Grand Jury, without intending it to be the basis for an indictment, condemns the acts and impugns the motives of individuals, whether they be public officials or private citizens. In the public mind such a report or presentment is the equivalent of a judicial finding, yet it lacks a fundamental principle in our system of judgment, the right to defend oneself, Pages 545, 546.

The Law Division quoted Chief Justice Gummere, G-u-m-m-e-r-e, in his charge to the Grand Jury of Essex County in 1907: In dealing with the matter, however, you must bear in mind that a presentment is sometimes a cruel thing. When a man is indicted his character is tainted because the general public believes that he would not be indicted if he had not violated the law. If he is innocent, however, he has the opportunity to demonstrate it. Where a presentment besmirches the reputation of a man, he has not the opportunity to justify himself. He goes through life with a stigma and there are no charges which he may He is charged with matters not subject to the criminal law, although not looked on with credit.

Such a presentment accuses but furnishes the accused with no right to his day in court. There is no forum in which he can test the truth of the charges

contained therein as the Grand Jurors in submitting such presentment are clothed with an absolute privilege, that's Page 46 of that opinion and it quotes O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N.J. Misc. 1 (1946).

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In re Presentment of Essex County Grand Jury, 110 N.J. 24 (App. Div. 1970) involved an application by the Mayor of Newark to expunge all references to him in a presentment returned by the Grand Jury. The Mayor's application was denied. The Court recognized the power of a Grand Jury to make a presentment on matters of public concern unaccompanied by indictments. The Court noted that a Grand Jury by means of a presentment may call to the attention of the public conditions within the county which in its view ought to be remedied, Page 27.

State v. Porro, 152 N.J. Super. 179 (App. Div. 1977) did not directly concern a Grand Jury presentment but it did discuss presentments. This case recognizes the Grand Jury practice of making a report or presentment on the state of public affairs or conditions of a particular area or on matters of general governmental interest with comments and criticisms of those affairs. The opinion also noted an enduring criticism of presentments which censure a public official. When the official is not indicted, he

or she is denied the opportunity to face accusers and refute accusations.

In re Presentment of Bergen County Grand Jury, 193 N.J. Super. 2 (App. Div. 1984) concerned a Grand Jury presentment regarding a county health institution. The Appellate Division noted that the first obligation of an assignment judge in reviewing a presentment is to determine whether the matter is a proper one for the presentment.

Daily Journal v. Police Department of City of Vineland, 351 N.J. Super. 110 (App. Div. 2002) recognized an anomaly concerning Grand Jury presentments. The Court observes that pursuant to Rule 3:6-9(c), a public official censured in a presentment is entitled to a hearing to clear his or her name before the presentment is made public. No such right is afforded to a private citizen who is named in a presentment but is not charged with a criminal offense, Page 129. The opinion notes the unique nature of the presentment process and its capacity to destroy the reputation of those who have not had an opportunity to defend themselves.

So, the first issue which the Court is going to address is the question of whether it should even consider the question as to whether a Grand Jury would

have the legal authority to return a presentment concerning clergy abuse issues.

The State argues that the challenge which is advanced by the Camden Diocese is premature. The State asserts that it's not possible to have a coherent discussion as to the propriety of a report which has not been written. The State urges the Court to empanel the State Grand Jury which has been requested, supervise that Grand Jury consistent with the appropriate statutes and court rules and wait to see what, if anything, that Grand Jury ultimately seeks to return to the Court for filing. The State asks the Court to strictly interpret the court rules and in essence stay out of the way until the promised presentment is referred to the Court for filing.

The Court strongly disagrees with this and I note that the circumstances which present here are highly unique. I note my own deep and abiding respect for the Grand Jury and its venerated role in New Jersey's criminal justice system. The Court fully respects the Grand Jury's independence and understands that prosecutors decide whom to prosecute and how to present cases for a Grand Jury's consideration. The Court also understands the deference which is afforded by law to a Grand Jury's work product in the form of

indictments.

2.4

But the unique circumstances which present here drive the conclusion that the Court's early involvement is appropriate. The Attorney General has made no secret as to its intentions. The Attorney General has stated that New Jersey should produce a report similar to what a Pennsylvania Grand Jury did. The Court takes judicial notice of that report published by order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on or about July 27 of 2018.

It's approximately 887 pages long. It's the product of 24-months work. It made several pages of recommendations but was largely a comprehensive report as to alleged sexual misconduct by Catholic priests. The Camden Diocese refers to numerous times where a member of the New Jersey clergy abuse task force publicly stated that a New Jersey Grand Jury would be producing a presentment.

There are presently five sitting State Grand Juries. Judges in the Mercer vicinage preside over the impanelment process and thereafter are involved as administratively necessary. That is, the Court handles Murphy hearings, it addresses requests by Grand Jurors to be excused early from service, it receives indictments for filing, and it establishes venue.

Otherwise, the Court has no real involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Grand Jury and that's entirely appropriate and consistent with the law. Most times the Court has no idea what the Grand Jury is doing until it's done. In theory, the State could go before a Grand Jury, prepare a presentment and have that brought to the Court for filing before the Court had an actual understanding of what was going on.

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The magnitude of what the Attorney General seeks to do here presents an entirely different circumstance. Bluntly, this is a massive undertaking that the State contemplates. The State wants to convene a Special State Grand Jury which will sit for at least one year and almost certainly longer. This involves bringing citizens to Trenton once a week from all corners of the State. This is a substantial imposition on the time of the 23 citizens asked to serve.

Additionally, selecting this Grand Jury will present challenges like no other. A Grand Jury is comprised of 23 members. An indictment or presentment requires the concurrence of 12 or more Grand Jurors. These Grand Jurors are required to disclose any possible bias or interest they may have in a specific case. This includes a bias or interest which is

financial, proprietary or personal. Normally, this is done on a case-by-case basis, and it is easily and routinely handled.

Seldom, if ever, issues as to whether a specific Grand Juror can sit threaten the quorum of the Grand Jury. The nature of the presentment that this Grand Jury is being asked to write or being told to write makes it clear that issues as to bias would have to be addressed during the selection process. It's plainly evident that many prospective Grand Jurors would struggle with being asked to serve.

The Attorney General advises the Court that a high percentage of New Jersey citizens identify as Catholic and in my estimation, the only way to select the Grand Jury in this situation would be to preemptively address conflict issues in advance and I believe the State agrees with that. That would involve disclosing the dioceses being investigated, the names of the churches at issue and probably even the names of the priests and the clergy who would be referenced in testimony. This broad disclosure would reasonably be expected to result in many people being excused for cause.

Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that many prospective Grand Jurors would struggle with the

subject matter of the Special Grand Jury's focus. Historically, that's so in any sexual assault case and the problem would certainly be exacerbated in cases concerning such allegations against religious leaders.

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And I make this point for the following reason. What this means is that there's a high volume of jurors who would have to be summoned. Again, based on my experience selecting Grand Juries, this means individualized interviews would have to be conducted of many, if not all, to avoid tainting other panel members. No doubt the Court would liberally excuse those who question their capacity to be fair or who felt uncomfortable with the subject matter.

Also, many prospective jurors would suffer personal or financial hardship if asked to serve on an in-person State Grand Jury for more than one year. Sixteen weeks is challenging enough. And if based on that during oral argument there was a discussion about how the Grand Jury selection process would take at least a week and probably more, I think we generally agree we'd be lucky if you got this Grand Jury in a week.

Would this selection be done virtually or in person? Right now as I understand it all Grand Jury selections throughout the state are still being done

virtually. How long would it take to properly instruct and then voir dire these prospective jurors? How long would it take to review the list of churches and clergy members for potential conflicts? How many jurors would need to be interviewed as to a perceived conflict?

And I want to be very clear about this. I make these observations not because I'm concerned about the time or the work. If it's appropriate for that to be done, we'll do it. But, rather, we are in a situation here where a legitimate challenge has been raised as to whether this prospective Grand Jury is legally authorized to do what the Attorney General's Office has promised it will do.

And the Supreme Court case relating to Loigman, 183 N.J. 133 (2005) makes it clear that the Grand Jury is a judicial investigative body serving a judicial function. It's an arm of the court, not a law enforcement agency and it's not an alter ego of any prosecutor's office. So the Court in my estimation is absolutely entitled to consider a challenge such as that made by the Camden Diocese before plunging headlong into a protracted jury selection process.

The Court's role here, again, it's not ministerial. It's judicial. And the Court is allowed to consider all this now and I think at this point in

the process while the Attorney General urges the Court to select the Grand Jury, the Court, I believe, is allowed to consider the ramifications on selected Grand Jurors. Why would we ask 23 individuals to accept the imposition that this Grand Jury service would entail if addressing a legitimate legal challenge first could obviate the need for service at all? And it's for that reason the Court believes that it has the right to decide the substantive issue here.

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The Court's supervisory authority over the Grand Jury is real. It uses it sparingly and only when necessary to ensure the fairness and integrity of the process. Recently in State v. Vega-Larrequi, V-e-g-a,  $\frac{\text{hyphen}}{\text{hyphen}} -- \text{I'm just going to spell the last name,} \\ \frac{\text{L-a-r-r-e-g-u-i}}{\text{--}} -- 246 \text{ N.J. } 94 \text{ (2021), the Supreme} \\ \text{Court said that in authorizing Grand Juries to operate in a virtual format for a temporary period during an unprecedented public health emergency the Court was simply exercising a quintessential judicial power that was not in any way in conflict with legislative enactment concerning the Grand Jury and I believe that an analogous situation presents here.$ 

The Court argues that counsel and the Court are speculating as to the content of a potential presentment, and I disagree on that though through its

press releases and through its public statements the Attorney General has made it crystal clear what's coming.

The State argues that judicial modesty requires the Court to take a wait-and-see attitude. Again, I disagree. This is a highly unusual circumstance. It's one not likely to recur any time soon. But these unusual situations compel unique resolutions and I don't believe that I'm obligated to refrain from considering the Camden Diocese's challenge until I see precisely what the Grand Jury produces. The broad outline of what's coming has been promised by the Attorney General and to paraphrase Bob Dylan, you don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.

The Court, in my opinion, has not only the legal and administrative authority to consider the challenge raised but also the duty to do so. In a time of scarce resources in the criminal justice system perhaps this has never been more true and I reference <a href="State v. Mackroy-Davis">State v. Mackroy-Davis</a> though I don't have the cite written in my notes here. Thus, the Court will decide the question of whether the State Grand Jury has the legal authority to issue a presentment regarding clergy abuse.

This Court's conclusion is that the Grand Jury does not have the legal authority to return a presentment which focuses exclusively or almost exclusively on misconduct by Catholic priests. a presentment should refer to public affairs and conditions. The presentment promised here does not. Misconduct, especially criminal misconduct by a priest is something the public cares about. That something is of great public importance or interest does not make it something which relates to public affairs or The priests are not public officials and conditions. the Catholic Church is not a public entity no matter how expansive a definition of the term public is contemplated.

And I'm going to make an analogy here that I know is an imperfect analogy but I do think it is useful. And what I'm going to do is look at the definition of public servant that's used in the Criminal Code and that's at N.J.S.A. 2C:27-1(g). And that defines public servant as any officer or employee of government including legislators and judges and any person participating as a juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise in performing a governmental function but the term does not include witnesses.

N.J.S.A. 2C:27-1(b) defines government to

include any branch, subdivision or agency of the government, of the state or any locality in it. These definitions apply to criminal defenses delineated in Chapters 27 through 30 of Title 2C which include important public corruption and misconduct crimes including but not limited to official misconduct, deprivation of civil rights as well as bribery and related offenses.

The definitions I reference are intentionally broad. They are designed to cover all three branches of government and those who interact with them. It is intended to address conduct by those given the power to exercise public authority even if that person is not a government employee. One must consider whether a governmental function is being carried out; State v. Perez, 185 N.J. 204 (2005).

It is also clear that not all persons who perform roles connected with government are public servants. Persons are not public servants if they are not exercising authority of a uniquely governmental nature or performing a function exclusive to government in any traditional sense; <u>State v. Morrison</u>, 227 N.J. 295 (2016).

And, again, I concede this is an imperfect analogy but I find it to be useful because it

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recognizes limitations as to what can be considered public. And even under the most sweeping applications of these definitions Catholic priests and the Catholic Church would not qualify.

2.4

To say that a presentment is appropriate because this is a matter of public concern is not enough. There are many things about which the public cares deeply and which are greatly important. This does not make private conduct eligible for Grand Jury presentment. Of course, crimes can and should be prosecuted. No one suggests that the State is not free to bring any criminal case it chooses to bring. A few such cases have been brought since the formation of the task force.

The State is correct when it argues that the Church and its clergy members have a direct and intimate relationship with New Jersey citizens. It is also true that the Church fulfills an important need within the community and its leaders are endowed with the public trust and that the public may well be incensed with what has occurred within the Catholic Church. This type of special and important relationship exists between the public and numerous other entities.

And I've tried to come up with good examples.

I really haven't but, Little League, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, various 12-step organizations, these are all special, important relationships but it does not confer upon the Grand Jury the right to construct a report about that which might be on the public mind.

The procedural posture of this matters as The State wants the Court to empanel a Special well. Grand Jury to ultimately release a presentment which has been written by the Attorney General. The idea for this presentment will never be said to have originated with this Grand Jury. It is the Attorney General's publicly-stated objective to produce this report. for that reason the Court is unpersuaded by the State's reference to the Grand Jury serving as the conscience of the community which has the ability to act as to matters of public concern. This Grand Jury would be a conduit to implement the will of the Attorney General.

When one considers whether this anticipated presentment concerns public affairs and conditions, it's useful to consider the Grand Jury instruction concerning presentments. And to the best of my knowledge, Directive 1206 which was published by memorandum of Philip S. Carchman, Judge of the Appellate Division, on July 20 of 2026 (sic) remains controlling, and I reference that directive. But it

does have a standard supplemental charge for Grand Juries regarding presentments which was approved by the conference of assignment judges and promulgated by Directive 1206 and I'm going to read this into the record.

2.4

When I charged you at the beginning of your Grand Jury service, I instructed you briefly about the Grand Jury's ability to return a presentment and briefly explained how it differed from an indictment or a no bill. I also informed you that I would instruct you in greater detail should you indicate that you wanted to consider a presentment. I shall now provide that additional instruction.

A presentment is a formal document presented by you to the public to call to the community's attention your recommendations as to some aspect of public affairs or conditions. The Grand Jury is an independent investigative body that represents the public and may, therefore, inquire into matters concerning community morals, health, safety and general welfare. In this connection you may inspect and visit public institutions, agencies, buildings and departments. If you find unsatisfactory conditions that are of such importance that they should be brought to the attention of the public and the officials

concerned, you may return a presentment for that purpose.

You may, for example, determine that there are certain conditions in a public office or public institution which demand correction or improvement and which should be revealed to the public for that purpose even though the evidence does not reach the level of constituting criminal conduct which would normally warrant an indictment. In other words, a presentment generally deals with non-criminal conduct.

To investigate such matters, you have the same broad, comprehensive and independent powers previously discussed. In an investigation that may lead to a presentment, you may cause witnesses to appear before you and, again, you are not limited simply to a consideration of matters that are presented to you by the prosecutor.

Unlike an indictment, a presentment is not the beginning of a criminal process and does not result in trials of individuals. A person who is named in a presentment has no defense nor any way of answering the presentment except under very limited technical procedures. For this reason presentments require the exercise of sensitive judgment on your part as well as a review by the Assignment Judge before they can be

made public.

2.4

If the public should be made aware of a condition that is caused by the non-criminal misconduct of a public official, that individual may be named and criticized. Before such presentment seeking censure of any individual is proved, you must be satisfied that proof of such wrongdoing is conclusive to show that the conduct of the individual is unquestionably related to the undesirable condition reported upon.

Criticism of a public official is allowable only where it is closely associated with the need to draw critical attention to the undesirable public condition. It would not be fair to name a person unjustifiably in a presentment and perhaps destroy that person's reputation and standing in the community.

And so, as a matter of fundamental fairness, if you return a presentment naming and censuring a specific individual, it will not be made public until I as assignment judge obtain and review the full record of the testimony and exhibits and determine that sufficient evidence has been presented to support such charges. If the Assignment Judge determines that the presentment is proper, it will be filed with the Clerk of the Court, and disclosed to the public. Please be aware that secrecy provisions relating to your service

as a Grand Juror also prevent you from disclosing any matters relating to a presentment.

And it is clear to me reviewing that charge, it's more clear to me that this matter does not concern public affairs or conditions as contemplated by the court rule and by the case law.

Second, the Court believes that it would be wrong for the Court to empanel a Grand Jury to prepare a presentment because this promised presentment and the procedures employed to produce it are systemically, fundamentally unfair in a way that can't be remedied or addressed. We all know that if a Grand Jury returns an indictment against someone, that person is entitled to a speedy and public trial. The defendant has the right to file motions which attack the State's case including motions to dismiss the indictment and motions which allege that evidence should be suppressed because the police violated Constitutional, statutory, common law or rule-based rights.

The defendant has the right to testify on his or her own behalf and to confront those who would accuse him, that the defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence and has -- strike that, please. The defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence and has the right to have a jury determine guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.

2.4

Those who would be accused by this promised presentment, and I use the word accused deliberately, enjoy no such protection. They have no recourse. There isn't a trial. There aren't any motions. There's no opportunity to attack the evidence as insufficient, fabricated, misinterpreted or the product of a statement of a person with a motive to lie or perhaps the product of a statement of a person who's mentally ill. There's no right to say the assertion is simply wrong and there is no right to generally say the proofs that are offered are unpersuasive.

Indeed, it appears that many of the priests who are covered by the time frame of the Grand Jury subpoenas are dead or of such advanced age that speaking up for oneself would be nearly impossible. And the Court wonders who speaks for these individuals? A Grand Jury issuing a presentment isn't even bound by a probable cause standard. There's no Judge present to monitor the admissibility of evidence, no witness gets cross examined, there's no gatekeeper as to anything. And the Grand Jury, is it really free to hurl accusations at those who are not provided any sort of a mechanism to fight back? This constitutes what years ago Camden-2 called a hit-and-run. It accuses, and by

the device that is used compels the accused to stand mute.

These priests, dead or alive, are not and were not public officials so the protections afforded by Rule 3:6-9 will not protect those individuals and I'm not going to review those rules again but I reference them. The rights there apply to public officials and in my estimation, a priest doesn't qualify as a public servant or official. The priest has no right to be heard before the issuance of the presentment. Many of them can't be heard for reasons far more complicated. They're not here to be heard. A church or the diocese has no right to push back and more importantly, no real forum to push back in.

And this document, this presentment becomes a public document readily available on the Internet to anyone in the world who wants it. And it's important to note that this presentment is not the equivalent of a book, a scholarly article or some kind of television documentary.

This presentment is issued only under the authority of the Superior Court. Once it's issued, it will ever seem to bear the court's imprimatur. The Court would become complicit in releasing a report which accuses people of criminal conduct but gives them

no forum to respond or to be heard. And a person who's not a public official ends up being given fewer rights than a person who is and this Court doesn't believe the Superior Court can allow that to happen. Again, consistent with <a href="Loigman">Loigman</a>, this is the Court's Grand Jury and that's a point which cannot be lost.

2.4

Third, the Court believes that the presentment is inappropriate because it's clearly intended to be a historical review of sexual abuse allegations against Catholic priests which were enabled by the Church's willful concealment. The <u>In re</u>

<u>Monmouth County Grand Jury</u> case, 24 N.J. 318 (1957) indicates that a Grand Jury can't forage at will upon anyone it may entertain and that expression must be limited to matters which are imminent and pertinent.

There's no imminence to the history that the Attorney General seeks to right here. There has been substantial public discourse concerning these important topics. It will continue. Law enforcement officials remain free to criminally charge any person when it is appropriate to do so. Everybody involved in this case urges law enforcement to charge when they've got a case.

No matter how important it might be to chronicle a comprehensive account of the sexual abuse

in New Jersey's Catholic Churches, it is not the Grand Jury's history to write. And it is certainly not for the Superior Court to create the impression that a countenance of such a report particularly when the subjects of the report are deprived of any meaningful due process. This is not a situation where there is any official wrongdoing to be deterred.

Now, it might be argued that the history could be written fully without naming names and the Court concedes that it does not know ultimately how the Attorney General intends to proceed. However, the reality here is that the curious will easily be able to draw associations which enable priests to be identified. Suppose the presentment identifies an occurrence which occurred at Church A in Town A between 1983 and 1985. It's relatively simple for inferences as to identity to be drawn. Any person interested in playing connect the dot could do so easily.

I think it's also somewhat relevant to take a step back and reflect upon why we're here. When the Attorney General announced the formation of the clergy abuse task force, he did so in clear reaction to the report issued by the Pennsylvania Grand Jury. The General said so himself. The report is approximately 887 pages. A 12-page introduction is followed by

approximately 284 pages which address six separate dioceses, individually.

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The third section contains approximately ten pages entitled The Church and Child Abuse Past and Present. Next is a section entitled Recommendations which is a mere seven pages. Last is an appendix of offenders which exceeds 500 pages. Indeed the introduction to the presentment directly stated the Grand Jury's intention is to, quote, name their names and describe what they did, end quote.

Now, if one looks at the presentment that came from the Pennsylvania Grand Jury, one can see that the first recommendation they made and arguably the most important recommendation that they made was to eliminate the statute of limitations for sexually And this is at Pages 307 and 308 of abusing children. This Grand Jury the report. It reads as follows. exists because Pennsylvania dioceses routinely hid reports of child sex crimes while the statutes of limitations of those crimes expired. We just do not understand why that should be allowed to happen. child abusers knew they could never become immune for their crimes by outrunning the statute of limitations, maybe there would be less child abuse.

We know our statute of limitations has been

extended recently so that now abusers can be potentially prosecuted until the victim reaches age 50 and that's good. It just doesn't help a lot of the victims we sought. No piece of legislation can predict the point at which a victim of child sex abuse will find the strength to come forward and no victim can know whether anyone will believe her or how long she will have to wait for justice.

If that seems hard to understand, think about Julianne. She was taught without question that priests are superior to other adults, even superior to her own parents because they are God in the flesh. So, when one of these flesh Gods put his finger in her vagina, who was going to tell? Julianne was 14 when she was assaulted. Now, she's almost 70.

Or Joe from Scranton. At the time he couldn't find anyone who was willing to hear about the naked masturbating priest who told him to take off his pants and get into bed. It took 55 years before he found us.

Or Bob from Reading. He told us that not a day goes by that he doesn't think about what happened to him. He can't bear to be touched by a man, not even to shake hands or to hug his own sons. He never reported it because he thought I was the only one. But

if he could still put that priest on trial even now, he would. Somebody has to be accountable, he told us. This has to stop. Bob is 83.

So, yes, we say no statute of limitations at all, not for this kind of crime. And it's not like we're asking for anything that unusual. It turns out that this is the rule in well over half the states across the country. No free pass for serious sexual violation of children, no matter how long it takes. That includes almost every State in our region, except us. If we lived in New Jersey, or Delaware, or New York or Maryland, we would today be issuing a presentment charging dozens of priests. But because we happen to live here instead, the number is two, not something for Pennsylvania to be proud of.

New Jersey's statute of limitations for sexual assault offenses is set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6. In 1990 the limitations period was five years. Since then it has been amended several times including in 1996 when it was amended to provide that a prosecution for a sexual assault may be commenced at any time.

Earlier this year in <u>State v. Rosado</u>, 256 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2023) the Appellate Division wrote regarding this change in the law in other words,

the Legislature decided to treat sexual assault like murder and eliminated the time limitation for bringing a prosecution for sexual assault. The Appellate Division noted that the 1996 amendment took effect immediately and was applicable to all offenses not yet barred from prosecution under the statute of limitations as of the effective date. And Rosado goes on to give a fairly lengthy and thorough history of New Jersey's statute of limitations concerning these sexual assault offenses.

The second recommendation of the Pennsylvania Grand Jury was to create a two-year civil window for child sex abuse victims who couldn't file lawsuits before. In 2019 the New Jersey Civil Statute of Limitations as to child sexual abuse was amended to provide victims the right to sue their abusers without a hearing pursuant to <a href="Lopez v. Swyer">Lopez v. Swyer</a>, 62 N.J. 267 (1973), until they reached 55 years of age.

Anyone over 55 was given seven years to bring an action from the date of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of child sexual abuse. The amendment also opened a window from December 1, 2021 through -- I'm sorry, my notes are wrong on that. My dates are wrong and I apologize for this. I just realized I wrote down the wrong dates.

But the amendment opened a window for people to bring an action for child sexual abuse whenever it occurred without having to first hold a  $\underline{\text{Lopez}}$  hearing.

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The third recommendation was to clarify the penalties for a continuing failure to report child abuse. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10 has long required any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subject to child abuse including sexual abuse, to report same immediately to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.14 makes knowing a violation of this statute a disorderly person and a fourth degree crime if the abuse is sexual abuse.

And the fourth recommendation is one that prohibits non-disclosure or agreements regarding cooperation with law enforcement.

And the point of that detour to talk about Pennsylvania which I understand was created completely under a different framework in terms of statutes and rules was to point out that the Pennsylvania document upon which New Jersey seeks to model itself was one that contained very few substantive recommendations. What it really intended to do was tell the story and write the history and that's what that Grand Jury sought to do and they very much said it up front and I quoted that language directly.

There are a couple of other additional points which I think is important for me to make. The Attorney General argues that this Special Grand Jury is necessary because it hasn't ruled out investigating or charging racketeering or a large scale conspiracy. The Court views this as something plausible in theory only. I respect the argument. It's a creative argument well made, but in my estimation that has no real chance of occurring.

The State also argues that the Special Grand Jury is needed to conduct a comprehensive review as to compliance with the 2002 memorandum of understanding with the dioceses, the Attorney General and the 21 county prosecutor's offices. The dioceses of all indicated a willingness to cooperate in this review. Oral argument indicated that the State had not initiated that dialogue since the memorandum had been written. And a review such as this, it's just fine but it doesn't require the Court to empanel a Special Grand Jury.

And the States also opined that the Camden Diocese's position is really just an improper sideways attack on the Grand Jury subpoena. Again, the Court disagrees and by the decision today I think it's clear that the Camden Diocese raised an important legitimate

substantive issue which is worthy of being addressed immediately.

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Also, in its brief the State attached a presentation relating to a situation in Middlesex County. It was referred to it in oral argument I think as the pipeline case, the <u>Dorham Woods</u> case, and I've reviewed that and I certainly saw it. It's part of the record. And it doesn't appear that that was ever challenged by anybody. The right to have that presentment does not appear to have ever been challenged or contested by anybody.

The State also argues that the anticipated presentment here may be the only justice available for certain victims and this Court should not intervene. And to that I incorporate my previous conclusions and note indeed there should be great compassion for anybody who's been truly victimized here. And there's no doubt there are victims here.

But a just system requires giving a person against whom accusations are made a fair chance to defend and it is not this Court's role to allow the Court's Grand Jury to participate in some form of a reckoning which is arranged by the State through the Grand Jury against people who are completely without ability to fight back and defend themselves. The Grand

Jury can't be given the opportunity to do a score settling which has been arranged by somebody else.

There's a case that was published in 2020, a Supreme Court case, State v. Shaw, which I think also points up the Court's role in supervising a Grand Jury and noting that while it's certainly rare that a Court is insinuated into what's going on in front of an active Grand Jury, it's not inappropriate and there are times when it is completely appropriate. And the cite for Shaw is 241 N.J. 223. The facts are very different than this but the principle, I think, is an important one.

In <u>Shaw</u> the Chief Justice considered the question as to whether there should be any limits on the number of times a prosecutor could submit a case to a Grand Jury to seek an indictment after a prior Grand Jury declined to indict so it's something very, very different than this. But the Court invoked its supervisory authority which is clear and it held that if Grand Jury has declined to indict on two prior occasions, the State has to obtain advance approval from the assignment judge before it can submit the case to a third Grand Jury. And the Assignment Judges were given a number of factors which they have to consider to determine whether re-present, presentment for a

third time is appropriate.

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And this opinion also contains a fairly lengthy statement as to the Grand Jury's evolving role which is generally to decide if there's probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and to protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. It doesn't talk about presentments. Presentments are fairly rare.

But this opinion also says that judicial review of what happens in the Grand Jury is generally limited and it's speaking about indictments here and that's something which is very different than a presentment. But it also says that the judiciary's power of review is ultimately rooted in the Doctrine of Fundamental Fairness which is an integral part of due process and the doctrine ultimately operates to protect citizens against unjust and arbitrary governmental action and specifically against government procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.

It's applied sparingly, only when the issues involved are especially compelling. And the Court discussed those factors at length. I just think the record should be clear that these situations, they're unique, they're unusual but they are compelling in a very different way that requires the Court's early

involvement.

And I want to reiterate that the Court does fully comprehend how unusual it is for a Court to intervene and dispute as to whether certain evidence can be presented to a Grand Jury. The unique situation here is one which ultimately requires the Court to stray from its traditional, limited hands off practices concerning the Grand Jury. This is not a situation where the Court is intervening in the indictment process.

The State in seeking this Special Grand Jury came to the Court seeking a sixth Grand Jury panel which would be asked to sit for at least one year and likely much more. The State seeks this Grand Jury truly not to indict criminal offenders but to issue a presentment just like a Pennsylvania Grand Jury did.

The targets of this presentment aren't public agencies, they aren't public servants and the Diocese of Camden voiced objection in this case and the Court exercised what it believes to be its ever present right and authority to supervise the operation or prospective operations of a Grand Jury. And in this instance the Court operates to prevent an unjust practice as opposed to remedy it or seek to remedy it after it has occurred.

And for the reasons which I've discussed, the purposes for which the State seeks to use this Grand Jury would be fundamentally unfair to so many living and dead who would be forever accused in a document released by the Court but to whom the Court gave no opportunity to defend and this distinct situation requires the Court's early intervention. Again, I use the language from I think it was the Camden case that this is judicial, not ministerial.

The Court has stated on multiple occasions that the presentment proposed by the State is ultimately fundamentally unfair and violative of elementary principles of due process. I want to make sure that this conclusion is construed as a legal conclusion and not in any way as an attack which is in any way personal to the good people who comprise the task force and the people who are representing the State in this matter.

The State is absolutely correct in arguing that the issue of sexual abuse by clergy members is vitally important. The public would no doubt benefit from the rendering of a comprehensive history. But it is not for well-intentioned prosecutors to use the court's Grand Jury to write a history which can never be meaningfully disputed.

Now, just as a couple of other things. I'm aware that since we've had oral argument there's been something that's come out in Maryland. I'm aware that something from Illinois came out this week. I'm not going to get into comparisons of what's happened in other states.

I do note that in Illinois what happened appears to have been a report from the Attorney General. It doesn't appear to have been a report issued by a Grand Jury. I understand the complicating factors here. Every state is different. And I just note this because I just think the record should note I'm aware. Here, I understand principles of Grand Jury secrecy would ultimately operate to keep the Attorney General from just being able to write a report. I know that, but I just think it's interesting.

And the Maryland report was issued a couple of months ago and that also speaks for itself, but I just thought it was appropriate to address that.

It's also interesting to note, I think, you know, using Illinois here and what they did I think Monday of this week, it's one thing for a prosecutor to stand up and say something. You see things on the news fairly regularly around the country where a prosecutor stands up and says through the application of new DNA

technology we have solved a particular murder.

From time to time including a recent one in New Jersey prosecutors go public and they say that. A person who they believe committed the murder is dead. They go public and they say that. There's no trial, there's no charge, there's no nothing, there's no opportunity to defend. That's a prosecutor doing it though. That's the executive branch doing it. That's not the Court doing it.

And here, I think one of the really controlling facts is that this report gets issued by the Court's Grand Jury and it is the Court that allows these allegations, however they are, and it promises to be big, to be put out there, to remain out there forever and to give absolutely no opportunity for any of the people who are named or called out by inescapable imputation, as I think Camden-1 says the opportunity to defend themselves and as the old expression goes, there's nowhere for them to go to get their reputation back. That just doesn't exist.

So, later today the Court will issue an order which in essence does the following. The Court is going to deny the Attorney General's request to have the Court empanel a Special State Grand Jury to serve the Attorney General's clergy abuse task force. There

are five sitting Grand Juries, and this Court concludes no additional panel is necessary.

The Court also concludes that the anticipated State Grand Jury presentment concerning clergy abuse within the Catholic Church is not authorized by law and this Court will not take any action which enables the process of preparing such a presentment to move forward.

As regards the issue of subpoena compliance, we didn't brief that. Based upon this ruling, the parties are to confer and to advise the Court whether further proceedings are necessary given this Court's order.

And the order is further going to clearly indicate that there's nothing in this order that prevents the Attorney General or any county prosecutor from pursuing an indictment against any specific individual and nothing in this order prevents the Attorney General from undertaking a comprehensive review of the 2002 memorandum of understanding.

And the record will reflect -- I know we spent time on the establishment clause issue. I don't need to reach that and I'm not going to reach that.

So, that completes the Court's decision. Thank you all for your patience. I'm sorry it took me

so long to get this decided. You've all been very patient and courteous. I can say it's a shortage of judges and that's, of course, a large part of it. It's just the demands of trying to come out of a pandemic have been -- they've been demanding. Demands are demanding. But I thank everybody for your courtesy and we'll get you the order by the end of the day today or tomorrow morning. Everybody have a nice weekend and we'll see you soon.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: May I ask one question, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your opinion as set forth from the bench, is it going to be --

THE COURT: It is not. I'm not going to write it. You would have waited longer if I tried to formulate it into something that I could release. That's why I did it orally.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Can we obtain a transcript?

THE COURT: Transcript? Sure. Anybody can get a transcript if they want one. It's under seal so you have to follow the normal procedures.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Yes.

THE COURT: But I can put in the order if

that's helpful to everybody that while the proceeding was under seal, counsel may obtain a transcript.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Thank you. UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes?

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: I'm sorry. One point for the record. Just, Your Honor, it's the State's position that the order to show cause on the issue of subpoena compliance is still live, and we request it to be before Your Honor and heard.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, what I'm directing is that you folks -- the lay of the land has changed considerably and I appreciate that you've taken this position regarding subpoena enforcement. But I think given the fact that the lay of the land has changed, we should at least try to have a conversation about where you stand.

I don't like to guess, but I'm fairly certain an appellate review is contemplated here and it may be that we need to wait and see what happens there before we go further because I've ruled and, you know, I explained where I stand. But if you're going to go to the Appellate Division, they'll have control over this issue and, you know, I don't want to start -- any decision I make now would be based upon where I am

right now. So, you know, but your position is noted, but I would urge counsel to talk.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Just, you know, I always learn --

THE COURT: You guys weren't going to just let me finish today, right?

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: I always learned Judge Fusca many years ago in Essex County (indiscernible) stand still, but we made the argument previously with regard to the order to show cause that it was issued by Judge Jacobson who realized after she signed it that she was --

THE COURT: Yes, if you're with me, we're doing it again. I'm not going to rely on any past argument or any past briefing. Again, the lay of the land has changed here.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, anybody else have anything?

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you, all. I

appreciate it. Everybody be well.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Thank you, Your

Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Thank you, Your

Honor.

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# <u>CERTIFICATION</u>

I, MARY POLITO, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CD, playback number 2:04 to 3:38, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings as recorded, and to the best of my ability.

## /s/ Mary Polito

MARY POLITO AOC #573

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC. DATE: January 27, 2025