Arguments for Thibodeax Appeal: Former Pastor’s Fate Hanging in the Balance

By MARY MCDONALD & SCOTT W. MARSTERS
Freestone County Times
July 24, 2015

http://www.freestonecountytimesonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13385:arguments-for-thibodeax-appeal-former-pastors-fate-hanging-in-the-balance&catid=47:top-headlines

Did a Freestone County trial court abuse its discretion by denying former pastor Anthony Lynn Thibodeaux’s motion for a new trial in March 2014, based on a possible Brady violation that may have resulted in egregious harm to the outcome of the case?

That is one of four issues raised, in which, the Texas 10th Court of Appeals shall deliberate then hand down its ruling to grant or deny Mr. Thibodeaux a new trial.

Thibodeaux was previously convicted for sexual assault and two counts of indecency with a child in Freestone County, Texas. (The minor child will be referred to as J.S. in this article.)

Oral arguments were not requested by the three Judge panel.

Instead, the Court will study the 66-page Appellant Brief, filed by Attorney E. Alan Bennett, on Mr. Thibodeaux’s behalf and the State’s 23-page Appellee Brief, filed by Assistant Freestone County District Attorney Cari E. Heinen.

ISSUE 1:

The trial court abused its discretion by denying Thibodeaux’s motion for a new trial premised on a Brady violation.

--APPELLANT BRIEF regarding Brady violation:

In the Appellant brief, Mr. Bennett asserts that Mr. Thibodeaux should not have been denied a new trial and wants the higher court to rectify that decision.

The State was in possession of Brady Evidence and suppressed it during the trial, i.e., Mr. Thibodeaux’s phone records, which would have refuted J.S.’s testimony that they had little contact by phone after the alleged offenses.

The brief concludes that these would have been favorable to Mr. Thibodeaux and been material to the outcome of the case, both components necessary for a new trial.

Appellant brief concedes that the State informed Mr. Thibodeaux’s attorney of the phone records.

However, the State failed to explore the exculpatory nature of the phone records.

Mr. Bennett asserts that the State had a legal duty to do so, even if the State did not know that the phone records contained exculpatory evidence.

The decision to deny a new trial was “arbitrary and unreasonable” in light of the Brady evidence.

--STATE’S BRIEF regarding Brady violation:

The State’s brief asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

Trial court was correct when finding that the State did not suppress evidence; the evidence was known, or available to the trial attorney, as the State has an “open door” policy; and the evidence was not material.

An open door policy “generally satisfies the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence,” according to case law cited in the State’s brief.

In responding to the allegation of suppressing evidence, according to the State’s brief, the County/District Attorney informed Mr. Thibodeaux’s attorney that he had his client’s phone records, and he could review them.

The State is not required to seek out exculpatory evidence on the defendant’s behalf, according to the State’s brief.

The phone records were also known to Mr. Thibodeaux, the State’s brief alleges.

“A Brady violation does not arise if the defendant, using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information,” the brief states.

The State also alleges that Mr. Thibodeaux’s attorney had access to J.S.’s phone records via the co-defendant’s attorney, Mr. David E. Moore.

Mr. Moore testified, during the motion for a new trial, that he had received J.S.’s phone records and provided those records to Mr. Thibodeaux’s attorney during the course of his trial.

In addition, according to the State, the defendant’s attorney also had ample time to subpoena J.S.’s records.

The phone records in the State’s file were those of the defendant. Therefore, he knew that calls and texts to/from J.S. had been made.

Mr. Thibodeaux testified at this trial that he had received at least one text following the alleged incident and that he had texted J.S. at least once. Therefore, the defendant would have been aware of any phone records available to him.

The State maintains that the phone records were not material to the case. The defendant testified that he had communicated with J.S. in the days following the alleged offense, which contradicted J.S.’s testimony.

Mr. Thibodeaux’s attorney impeached J.S. with her own records when he recalled her to the stand, asking if she had texted with him 332 times.

Recorded in the State’s brief, Mr. Thibodeaux’s attorney pointed to testimony that J.S.’s life did not change after the alleged offense, stating in closing arguments, “I think she wouldn’t send him messages. What did he say? She sent me messages. The question is who do you believe?”

The phone records were brought up to the jury with that statement, according to the State’s brief.

The State concludes that the receipt of the phone records would not have changed the outcome or have changed the defense theory that the defendant did not commit the charged offenses. It would not have any impact on trial counsel’s ability to cross-examine J.S.

ISSUES 2 & 3:

The jury charge in the sexual assault case and the indecency cases erroneously instructed the jury regarding the applicable culpable mental states.

--APPELLANT BRIEF Asserts Issues 2 & 3:

In the sexual assault charge, the offense was defined as a conduct-oriented offense instead of a result-oriented offense and the words “intentionally” and “knowingly” were incorrectly used.

The charge also failed to instruct the jurors regarding the correct culpable mental states.

Indecency with a child carries a specific culpable mental state that involves only intentional conduct.

--STATE’S BRIEF Response Issues 2 & 3:

The State concedes the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury by defining sexual assault as a results-oriented offense and did not use the correct definitions for “intentionally” and “knowingly.”

However, the application paragraph in the court’s charge correctly instructed the jury, and the correct law was quoted in the voir dire, when informing the jury of the State’s burden of proof in the case.

Further, the State contends that the defense attorney raised no objection at trial, and the jury did not send out a note indicating difficulties in understanding the charge.

Finally, the Appellant did not challenge his culpable mental state, but instead denied committing the offense.

The State also concedes that the judge’s charge in the two indecency cases erroneously defined the offense of indecency with a child by contact, and sexual contact, as well as erroneously requiring that the defendant acted “intentionally and knowingly.”

The State further concedes that these weigh in favor of finding egregious harm.

However, the focus of the trial was not on the intent of the defendant, but rather on whether he committed the offenses at all.

Therefore, the evidence does not weigh in favor of finding egregious harm.

ISSUE 4:

The jury charges failed to provide a meaningful limiting instruction with regard to the extraneous-offense evidence.

--APPELLANT BRIEF Asserts Issue 4:

The jury charge failed to provide meaningful limiting instruction with regard to evidence obtained from Mr. Thibodeaux’s computers.

The court essentially erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction that focused the jury’s attention on the specific purpose for which the evidence was offered.

--STATE’S BRIEF Response Issues 4:

The State concedes that the limiting instruction given to the jury was in error, because it was not limited to the specific purposes for which the State was offering the extraneous offense evidence.

However, even though the trial court did not tailor the limiting instruction to the purposes in which the State was offering the evidence, the inclusion of the instruction did inform the jury that it was offered for limited purposes and that the evidence could only be considered if the jury determined the defendant committed the acts beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion:

The 10th Court of Appeals ruling may come down as soon as July 30th.

At that time, Mr. Thibodeaux will learn if he will be granted a new trial or will serve out his concurrent sentences of 10-4-4 years.

Reported by Mary McDonald and Scott W. Marsters, Sr.

Thibodeaux Case History

In December 2013, Mr. Thibodeaux was found guilty of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child in Freestone County, Texas.

Maintaining his innocence, Mr. Thibodeaux appealed the verdict in March 2014 in Judge Deborah Oakes Evans’ 87th District Courtroom and asked for a new trial.

Judge Evans denied the motion, concluding that another trial would not produce a different outcome.

However, a co-defendant was acquitted of all charges four month after Mr. Thibodeaux’s request for a new trial.

It was exposed in the co-defendant’s jury trial that the minor had lied when she testified that she had not exchanged numerous text messages with Mr. Thibodaux following the alleged incident.

Anthony Thibodeaux standing before District Judge Debra Oakes Evans during his original trial, flanked by County Attorney Chris Martin (left) and Defense Attorney Justin Reed (right).


Legal Terms to Know

-- Allegation: claim or assertion that someone has done something illegal or wrong

--Appellant: a person who applies to a higher court for a reversal of the decision of a lower court.

--Brady Violation: suppression of evidence by the prosecution that is favorable to an accused.

--Brief: written legal document that is presented to a court arguing ones point to a court.

--Concurrent sentences: two or more penal sentences that are served simultaneously

--Conduct-oriented offense: behavior on a particular occasion

--Consecutive sentences: two or more penal sentences that are to be served one after the other

--Culpable mental state: State of mind of an individual while committing a crime.

--Defendant: party against which an action is brought

--Egregious harm: flagrant violation of human rights.

--Exculpatory evidence: Favorable to the defendant that exonerates or tends to exonerate the defendant of guilt.

--Material Evidence: that which has a logical connection to a fact of consequence to the outcome of a case.

--Oral arguments: spoken to a judge or appellate court by a lawyer of the legal reasons why they should prevail.

--Result-Oriented offense: outcome of a particular behavior

--Subpoena: a written order for a person to attend a court

--Testimony: evidence given by a witness in a law court

--Voir dire: preliminary examination of prospective jurors to determine their qualifications and suitability to serve on a jury