Establishment Clause Extended to Non-ordained Clergy Member

Dennis J. Dozis, New York Law Journal
August 7, 2014

http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/home/id=1202665981737/Establishment-Clause-Extended-to-NonOrdained-Clergy-Member?mcode=1202615326010&curindex=1&slreturn=20140708082851

Religious freedom is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence.1 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."2 The Establishment Clause "is a prohibition of government sponsorship of religion which requires that government neither aid nor formally establish a religion."3 Said prohibition exists because there is a substantial danger that the government will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs.4

Although civil disputes involving religious parties may be adjudicated if neutral principles of secular law are exclusively involved, the Establishment Clause absolutely prohibits civil courts from deciding actions in which the nature of the issues raised are in any way religious.5 As the New York Court of Appeals has explained:

The United States Constitution protects the right of individuals to believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs…If these doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain…[C]ivil courts are forbidden from interfering in or determining religious disputes. Such rulings violate the First Amendment because they simultaneously establish one religious belief as correct ... while interfering with the free exercise of the opposing faction's beliefs.6

As a result of the prohibition against secular entanglement in religious beliefs, the courts of this state have undertaken the arduous task of defining the Establishment Clause's scope in sexual affair and abuse cases and identifying which individuals are protected thereunder. In so doing, the courts have published tense decisions and engendered precedent contracting and expanding the constitutional proscription.

For example, in Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, a parishioner of a Queens church brought, inter alia, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against a priest and a diocese in connection with an alleged sexual affair which developed during the course of spiritual counseling.7 The Supreme Court, Kings County, dismissed the claims upon motion practice, and plaintiff appealed. By a 3-1 decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed and held that:

The cause of action alleging that [the priest] negligently handled the counseling relationship in fact stated a claim for malpractice. As such, it was properly dismissed because any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion.8

In a partially dissenting opinion, Justice Sondra M. Miller sharply disagreed with the majority and opined that the plaintiff's allegations fully supported recovery against the priest under a theory of breach of fiduciary duty. In her dissent, she stated:

I disagree most significantly with the majority's holding that any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion. That holding will establish appellate precedent shielding from civil judicial examination even the most flagrant clerical misconduct perpetrated upon vulnerable parishioners, children as well as adults. The injured will be deprived of any recourse short of criminal prosecution. The miscreant clergy, unsanctioned, will remain free to continue undeterred.…Moreover, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was not intended to protect the misconduct of clergy where examination of their conduct does not require any inquiry into church doctrine. Clearly no examination of church doctrine is required in order for the plaintiff's claims against her priest to be heard.9