Santillan V. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno

Leagle
February 2, 2012

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SANTILLAN v. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO

GEORGE SANTILLAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B221409.

Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Eight.

Filed February 1, 2012.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

GOOD CAUSE appearing, the opinion filed January 6, 2012, in the above entitled matter is hereby modified as follows:

1. On page 10, line 11 of the text, delete "as that term is defined in section 340.1, subdivision (b)(2)" so that the sentence ends after "sexual conduct."

2. On page 10, footnote 4, delete the text of the footnote and replace it with the following sentence: "The Doe court held that the term `unlawful sexual conduct' refers to the acts specified in section 340.1, subdivision (e), which defines ``[c]hildhood sexual abuse' in terms of seven provisions of the Penal Code describing various prohibited sexual acts against minors. (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 545-546.)"

3. On page 10, line 15, through page 11, line 4 of the text, replace the entire sentence that begins "Fourth, in the case . . . ." with the following: "Fourth, reason to know means that the entity defendant has acquired actual knowledge of facts from which a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, or one of the superior intelligence of the actor, would either infer, or consider highly probable, that the agent had previously committed an act of unlawful sexual conduct with the minor. (Id. at pp. 545-549.)"

4. At the end of the new sentence just described in paragraph 3, above, add the following footnote: "In the case of an entity defendant like the Diocese, which operates through an organizational hierarchy composed of various officers, agents, managers, and employees, the defendant's "reason to know" must refer to knowledge acquired by a sufficiently authorized representative of the entity. That person's knowledge must then be evaluated by the standard of either a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, or of a person who has "superior," or specialized knowledge that would pertain to his evaluation of the facts he has acquired. We need not elaborate on that standard because that issue is not before us; its parameters will perhaps be determined by another court."