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	The Kiesle Case By Mark Silk Spiritual Politics April 12, 2010 http://www.spiritual-politics.org/2010/04/the_kiesle_case.html Over at In All Things, Sean Michael Winters makes a valiant effort to defend the Vatican's handling of the case of Oakland priest Stephen Kiesle but, I'm afraid, comes up short. The media, including present company, have not jumped to unwarranted conclusions about the behavior of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) and its leader, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, by failing to read documents from the case carefully and misunderstanding the context. This is not an example of "frustratingly poor coverage." (Proceed to the jump.) Take a close look at the 1981 documents. It is evident that what the NYT posted online represents only part of the case file. For example, an affidavit from one of Kiesle's seminary teachers, which Oakland Bishop John Cummins says he is enclosing in response to the CDF'S request, is not to be found. More importantly, the initial three documents from the Oakland diocese requesting that Kiesle be defrocked were part of a more extensive dossier compiled over several months--based on the numbering in the upper right hand corner--and forwarded to Rome July 15. Why should this matter? As Winters presents the case, the diocese was notably diffident about how it presented Kiesle's criminal behavior to the CDF. This, he says, was merely a request for laicization from Kiesle himself, not (as the 1983 Code of Canon Law would specify) a referral of "graviora delicta"--very serious moral violations. But the documents we have show the diocese making it abundantly clear to the CDF that Kiesle was an adjudicated child molester whose case had received widespread attention in the press. (In all likelihood, there is additional supporting evidence not included in the posted documents--perhaps even mention of "graviora delicta.") The point is that the bishop wanted the priest defrocked as a notorious bad actor, and was making it clear that this was far more than one cleric's request to leave the priesthood. How did the CDF reply? In November of that year--prior to Ratzinger taking charge--came a Latin missive (untranslated in the document series) requesting more evidence and, astonishingly, asking that the bishop promise that he had no fear of scandal if the laicization took place. Now Winters argues that Ratzinger, later, could not have been dragging his feet on the case to avoid scandal because "[t]hat publicity had already occurred." But in fact, the CDF had already done exactly that when it asked for Cummins' promise. And Ratzinger was doing the same when he subsequently wrote that the CDF was "unable to make light of the detriment that granting the dispensation can provoke with the community of Christ's faithful, particularly regarding the young age of the petitioner." As was typical, it was the fear of causing scandal that was determinative. Cummins responded to the CDF's November 1981 request in a February 1982 letter to Ratzinger that provided the documentation requested and expressed his conviction that there might be greater scandal if Kiesle were "allowed to return to active ministry" than if he were defrocked. And at that point the slow walk commenced in earnest. Over the next four years, the diocese made repeated efforts to get the CDF to deal with the case, receiving a response from Ratzinger only after getting the papal nuncio to the United States, Pio Laghi, to intervene in September of 1985. In contrast to the CDF's 1981 response, Ratzinger did not ask for more documentation. He simply cited fear of harming the community, i.e. causing scandal, as the reason to take more time considering the case, particularly in light of Kiesle's young age (in his 30s). The bishop is enjoined to provide Kiesle with "as much paternal care as possible," bearing in mind that the CDF "is accustomed to proceed keeping the common good especially before its eyes." The diocesan official in charge himself concluded that this was simply a delaying tactic on the CDF's part--and indeed, not until 1987, having reached the age of 40, was Kiesle defrocked. In the meantime, he had managed to secure a position as a volunteer youth minister at a church north of Oakland. (See time line.) In short, on taking charge of the CDF Ratzinger became part of the cover-up regime. Indeed, there was no sign that the CDF was delaying the Kiesle case until he took charge. And the delay continued amidst the huge media commotion over the Gauthe case in Louisiana, the first of the big priest pedophile scandals, which broke in the Spring of 1985. At that time, meanwhile, Ratzinger was bringing the hammer down on theologian Charles Curran (for being soft on sexual ethics) and Seattle Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen (in part for his ministry to homosexuals), and preparing a document condemning tolerance of homosexuality ("Pastoral Care of Homosexuals"). So in what would become a familiar two-step, it was the hard line on sexual doctrine, the tolerant understanding for abusive priests. None of this is to deny that, in later years, Ratzinger came to recognize the need for getting tough on abusers. It's just that he didn't start out that way. So good try, Sean Michael, but no cigar.
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